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Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35
DEBORAH L. BRAKE* & JOANNA L. GROSSMAN**
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) with a
specific purpose in mind—to override the Supreme Court’s refusal in a 1976 case
to see pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.1
The Act consists of two clauses. The first defines sex discrimination to include
discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical
conditions.”2 A second clause directs employers to treat pregnant workers the
same as other employees with a similar “ability or inability to work.”3 The PDA
brought about some immediate and significant changes in employer policies
relating to hiring, firing, and benefits.4 In a series of decisions interpreting the
PDA, the Supreme Court has bolstered the Act’s force with broad interpretations
tailored to its underlying purposes.5 But the PDA turns thirty-five this year, and
with its advancing age have come complications. Judicial complications.
Over time, as interpreted by the lower courts, the PDA has withered in
scope and come to embody the same narrow view of pregnancy discrimination
that drove the notorious Supreme Court decisions that led to its enactment in the
first place. In recent decisions, lower federal courts have taken a stilted view of
the definition of pregnancy and the meaning of discrimination, to the detriment
of women generally, but especially working class and lower-income women. In
so doing, the courts have misread the statute and reinforced the very gender
ideology surrounding work and maternity that the Act was intended to dislodge.
The PDA case law has been burdened by some of the same pitfalls that have
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1. The Supreme Court took this position on Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 140 (1976), which adopted the reasoning of its earlier decision taking a similar position on the
relationship between pregnancy discrimination and sex discrimination under the equal protection
clause. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974).
2. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
3. Id.
4. On the effects of the PDA, see generally Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise
of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567 (2010).
5. See text accompanying notes 64-94 infra.
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cut short the reach of discrimination law generally: a resistance to
“bootstrapping,” a hostility toward accommodation mandates, and a narrow
view of discrimination as conscious animus against the protected group. While
not limited to the PDA, the emergence of these themes in PDA cases is jarring
given the distinctive language of the Act. Running counter to the plain text of
the Act, the restrictive lower court decisions are animated by stereotypical
gender ideologies about pregnancy and maternity in relation to paid work.
This article takes a comprehensive look at recent case law under the PDA,
while offering a critical commentary on the gender ideology that lies behind
these decisions and charting the stakes for women in a reinvigorated Act. The
survey of PDA decisions is an important undertaking in its own right, since it is
not widely appreciated just how much courts have narrowed the PDA’s
protections. The PDA cases are an increasingly sorry lot, including cases like the
recent Fourth Circuit ruling in Young v. UPS, in which the court held that a
pregnant woman could lawfully be denied a light-duty assignment necessitated
by a medical restriction on lifting even though the company made such
accommodations for on-the-job injuries, for disabilities entitled to
accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and for
conditions, medical or otherwise, leading to the loss of driving certification.6 As
this article explains, the recent expansion of the ADA, which should redound to
the benefit of PDA plaintiffs by increasing the pool of comparators, has ironically
made matters worse.7
From recent successes confronting the “maternal wall,” one might get the
impression that pregnancy discrimination is a thing of the past or that the law
adequately responds to it.8 But the maternal wall—the barriers to employment
equality faced by mothers—begins with pregnancy.9
Indeed, pregnancy
discrimination makes up a significant chunk of the maternal wall. According to
one author, reviewing the literature on pregnancy discrimination, “[a]lmost half
of all working women in western countries have experienced tangible
discrimination on this basis, such as being denied training opportunities, changes
to job descriptions, criticism of their performance or appearance, reduced
working hours and dismissal without good reason after the announcement of
pregnancy.”10 The number of charges alleging pregnancy discrimination filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) increased by
6. 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-1226, 2013 WL 1462041 (U.S. Apr. 8,
2013).
7. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 2008
U.S.C.C.A.N. (122 Stat.) 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102).
8. For example, the EEOC has issued guidance on discrimination related to caregivers in the
workplace. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with
Caregiving Responsibilities (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/caregiving.html. See also Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 77 (2003).
9. See Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and Parental
Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 737, 751 (2004) (suggesting that
pregnancy is the trigger for discrimination against mothers, and that discrimination against working
mothers can begin even before the birth of a child).
10. Liisa Mäkelä, A Narrative Approach to Pregnancy-related Discrimination and Leader-follower
Relationships, 19 GENDER, WORK AND ORG. 677, 680 (2012).
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41.1% between 2000 and 2010, on top of almost as large an increase in the decade
prior.11 In the past five years, the EEOC has pursued and obtained significant
damages in pregnancy discrimination cases.12 In 2012, it released a draft strategic
plan that included “accommodating pregnancy when women have been forced
onto unpaid leave after being denied accommodations routinely provided to
similarly situated employees” among the “emerging issues” it plans to target.13
Media outlets have started to note the rise in claims and the apparent persistence
of pregnancy discrimination.14 Although pregnancy takes up a relatively short
time in the average woman’s participation in the labor force, the effects of
discrimination against pregnant workers continue long after pregnancies end.15
In contrast to the tilt of popular narratives about mothers’ “choices” to
reduce their attachment to the workforce—narratives that implicitly reference the
experiences of a select group of women—the women who lose the most under
the courts’ cramped readings of the PDA are the least privileged and most
economically vulnerable women. The PDA is failing the women who need it
most—those who work inflexible hours or in rigidly structured work settings or
who perform physically demanding tasks. Cases like the one brought by a
pregnant fitting room attendant at Wal-Mart who claimed that she was fired for
carrying a water bottle at work (per doctor’s orders) illustrate the problem.16
Professional women in more flexible work settings may still lose their cases, but
they have a better chance of finding at least some protection under the Act, if
they can prove that their opportunities were limited based on stereotyped and

11. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pregnancy Discrimination Charges EEOC &
FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2011 (2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm; see NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, THE PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION ACT: WHERE WE STAND 30 YEARS LATER 12 (2008) (noting, among other trends, a
dramatic increase in claims filed by women of color). See also N. Woodward, Pregnancy Discrimination
Grows, 50(7) HR MAG. 78-83 (2005) (noting the growth of pregnancy discrimination cases filed with
the EEOC).
12. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 11, at 11 (noting an increase in the
percentage of EEOC-instigated lawsuits that include a pregnancy discrimination claim from 1.3% in
1997 to 8.6% in 2006). See also EEOC, supra note 11 (showing that monetary benefits paid out annually
through EEOC conciliations, not including subsequent litigation, more than doubled in the last
decade, rising from $5.6 million in 1997 to $12.2 million in 2008, with an all-time high of $30 million
collected in 2007 alone).
13. EEOC,
Strategic
Enforcement
Plan
(Sept.
4,
2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/plan/sep_public_draft.cfm.
14. See, e.g., Lesley Alderman, When the Stork Carries a Pink Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at B6
(reporting suspicion among lawyers that “some employers are now using the law’s laxity and the
dismal economy to tacitly discriminate against new or expectant mothers”); Stephanie Armour,
Pregnant Workers Report Growing Discrimination, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2005, at B1 (noting a “soaring”
number of pregnancy discrimination claims); Tresa Baldas, Pregnancy Discrimination Suits on the Rise,
NAT’L L.J., April 14, 2006, at 4 (noting increase in pregnancy discrimination lawsuits, “particularly
among high-level female executives who claim that they are being knocked off the corporate ladder
because of maternity issues”).
15. See D.M. Houston & G. Marks, The Role of Planning and Workplace Support in Returning to Work
after Maternity Leave, 41(2) BRITISH J. OF INDUS. REL. 197,(2003) (discussing research showing that an
employee’s experiences in the workplace while pregnant influence her decisions about whether and
when to return to work after childbirth).
16. See Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 2168911 at *2 (D. Kan. July
21, 2009).
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untrue assumptions about how pregnancy affects their work capacity or
commitment. And they have a greater chance of reconciling the effects of
pregnancy with work obligations without needing to resort to litigation. In
short, while the PDA still offers some protection from animus-based
discrimination, it has become increasingly unhelpful to those women whose
pregnancies are most likely to harm their economic security.
Recent scholarship on pregnancy discrimination has pressed for treating
pregnancy as a disability under the ADA. This work raises the question of
whether the ADA might better address the issues facing pregnant workers, and if
so, whether there remains any real need for a reinvigorated PDA. We consider
this question and conclude that there is still value in addressing the harm of
pregnancy discrimination specifically as a sex equality right, even if (indeed,
even though) we agree with those scholars making the case for recognizing
pregnancy as a disability under the ADA. There is a distinctive history of
framing challenges to pregnancy discrimination as a sex equality right that is
worth preserving, and strengthening the sex equality foundations of the right
may potentially strengthen the broader social and legal movements for gender
equality and reproductive justice.
Part I of this Article sketches the origins of the PDA, the backdrop of
Supreme Court decisions leading to its enactment, and the Supreme Court’s
cases interpreting the Act. The Act purported to herald a new era in which
pregnant women could obtain, perform, and retain jobs despite becoming
pregnant. The PDA was crucial in dismantling widespread employer practices
that stereotyped pregnant women as unsuitable for paid work and summarily
dismissed them from jobs or barred their entry in the first place. School district
policies barring pregnant women from teaching once they “showed” were
emblematic of such practices.17 The law reflected more “enlightened” views
about pregnancy and its compatibility with paid work, and the Supreme Court
cases interpreting the Act have largely remained true to these purposes. Despite
these auspicious beginnings, an increasingly hostile judiciary has narrowed the
definition of pregnancy discrimination and the categories of workers deemed
useable as comparators, creating significant gaps in the statute’s protections.
Part II explores these gaps and the doctrinal questions that have befuddled
lower courts in recent years. It focuses on two primary problems. First, courts
have come to understand the first clause of the PDA to prohibit only those
actions that penalize the status of pregnancy rather than its actual effects.
Second, and even more importantly, courts have stripped clause two of the PDA
of its substantive content. In a disturbing new trend, courts have allowed
employers to grant accommodations to other workers but withhold them from
pregnant employees as long as the employer can point to some pregnancyneutral basis for distinguishing them. Courts are doing this despite clear
statutory language directing employers to treat pregnant workers the same as
others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”18 This approach collapses

17. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (challenging the
constitutionality of mandatory maternity leave rules requiring a pregnant school teacher to take
unpaid leave for five months before expected childbirth until three months after giving birth).
18. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
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the first and second clauses of the PDA and reinvigorates the kind of sui generis
treatment of pregnancy in the Gilbert ruling that Congress sought to override.
Part III discusses some common themes that these recent developments in
pregnancy discrimination law share with discrimination law generally, including
courts’ resistance to perceived “bootstrapping,” hostility to accommodation
requirements, and an increasing emphasis on conscious animus as the only
legitimate target of discrimination law. This Part then discusses why these
themes, while not wholly unexpected in the PDA, are particularly striking in
light of the text of the statute. We then sketch the gender ideology underlying
these rifts in the PDA case law. At bottom, ideologies about pregnancy,
maternity and work are interfering with the courts’ ability to recognize
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy despite the clear text of the PDA.
Part IV considers the implications of the PDA from the perspective of social
justice feminism. Social justice feminism responds to calls for attention to
intersectionality, anti-essentialism, and class by examining the multivariate
dimensions of gender injustices.19 The PDA’s shortcomings are troublesome for
all women, but especially for women in lower-wage jobs, traditionally male
occupations, and highly structured workplaces.
These women are
disproportionately poor or working class, and disproportionately women of
color. The work-life “balance” issues of more privileged women most often set
the terms of the cultural debate about combining paid work and maternity.20 But
the conflicts between pregnancy and work, and the law’s inadequate response to
them, play out most severely among the most economically vulnerable women—
those for whom choice is minimal or absent.
Finally, Part V acknowledges the call of disability law scholars to include
pregnancy as a protected disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
and considers the implications of that argument for the PDA. While our position
is in no way antithetical to those calls—indeed, we find persuasive the “social
model” of disability that should encompass pregnancy—we believe that the
ADA should not be viewed as a replacement for the PDA. While pregnant
workers should pursue all viable legal claims for addressing discrimination, the
PDA has a distinctive role in anchoring the women’s legal movement for gender
equality. It should be reinvigorated rather than abandoned. Chronicling the
flaws in current interpretations of the PDA, and elaborating the troubling gender
ideologies behind them, is a first step in that process.
I. THE EARLY PROMISE OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
The PDA responds to a long history of state laws and employer practices
purportedly protecting women from the rigors of work and its incompatibility
with motherhood. State laws often relied on pregnancy-based classifications

(2012).
19. See, e.g., Kristen Kalsem & Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism, 18 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J.
131 (2010).
20. See, for example, the high profile and controversial discussions triggered by Lisa Belkin, The
Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t
Have it All, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020.
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when regulating employment generally or setting policies for public employees.
In Muller v. Oregon, for example, decided in 1908, the Supreme Court upheld a
law restricting the number of hours women could work in laundries on the
theory that the state was justified in acting to protect the “maternal functions” of
women.21 Such laws ostensibly accommodated the domestic and reproductive
obligations of women to protect them from exploitation by employers. As
Deborah Dinner explains, female-only minimum wage laws attempted to “shift[]
the social costs of substandard wages back onto employers,” while maximumhours laws “alleviated the burden placed upon women by the unequal division
of childrearing labor within the home, without challenging its normative
correctness.”22 But this “protection” was often a pretext for preserving better
jobs for men and did not affect all women equally.23 Working-class women and
women of color “spearheaded the campaign against the laws” because they
“faced the greatest economic need to access the higher-paying blue-collar jobs
that protective laws placed beyond their reach.”24 And while they suffered the
most from the costs of protection, these women received relatively few of the
benefits. They “worked disproportionately in occupations excluded from the
Fair Labor Standards Act as well as from state protective-labor laws.”25 Vestiges
of this regime lingered long into the twentieth century, as a wide variety of state
laws and employer policies restricted occupations, job duration, and benefits
based on sex, pregnancy, childbirth, childrearing, or a combination thereof, all
designed to reinforce (white) women’s prescribed maternal roles.26
A. The Pre-PDA Legal Landscape
The landscape began to shift in the early 1970s, when women’s rights
advocates succeeded in establishing a constitutional right of sex equality and the
statutory ban on sex discrimination in Title VII began to take shape.27 Whether
these rights protected against pregnancy discrimination was initially unclear.
Women began bringing claims alleging “pregnancy discrimination” shortly after
the EEOC was established in 1965, only to find that little thought had been given
to whether that was a cognizable claim.28 Responding to pressure from
21. 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
22. Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 444-45 (2011).
23. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1219, 1237-38, 1239 (1986) (observing that “[f]etal vulnerability policies excluding all fertile
women have been adopted only in male-dominated industries,” while “women are generally allowed
to work in women’s jobs without restrictions based on fetal safety”); David L. Kirp, Fetal Hazards,
Gender Justice, and the Justices: The Limits of Equality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 101, 115 (1992)
(“Expressions of corporate concern for the plight of fetuses . . . have been highly selective. Businesses
that depend heavily on women workers have been much less scrupulous about the dangers they
impose on the unborn . . . .”).
24. Dinner, supra note 22, at 446.
25. Id. at 445.
26. This era of workplace policies is explored in detail in Grossman, supra note 4.
27. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a sex-based classification in an Idaho
intestacy statute on grounds that it did not bear a sufficient relation to the government’s purpose);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications).
28. Dinner, supra note 22, at 455-57.
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advocates, the EEOC issued its first guidelines on pregnancy discrimination in
1972, concluding that Title VII extended to discrimination based on pregnancy.29
But the law developed unevenly. Despite the EEOC guidelines, the Supreme
Court ruled twice in the 1970s that pregnancy discrimination is not sex
discrimination. In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court upheld, against an equal
protection challenge, California’s disability insurance program, which expressly
excluded normal pregnancy from the list of covered disabilities.30 The Court
rejected the argument that pregnancy-based classifications should receive the
heightened scrutiny it had implicitly, albeit without express acknowledgement,
already applied to sex-based classifications.31 Relegating the bulk of its analysis
to a footnote, the Court explained, infamously: “There is no risk from which men
are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women
are protected and men are not. . . . The program divides potential recipients into
two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”32 The Court thought
it obvious that there was no connection between the “excluded disability and
gender.”33
Two years later, the Court upheld a similar plan by a private employer
against a Title VII challenge. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,34 the Court tracked
its equal protection reasoning from Geduldig and applied it to Title VII, holding
that excluding normal pregnancy from a disability benefit plan did not
discriminate based on sex.35 The Court rejected the contrary interpretations of
the EEOC and the seven federal courts of appeals that had followed the EEOC’s
lead.36 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion.37
As bad as these decisions were for pregnant working women, the Supreme
Court’s pregnancy jurisprudence did not foreclose all challenges to pregnancybased employment policies. The treatment of pregnant workers could still be
successfully challenged if it punished women for the status of being pregnant,
without regard to pregnancy’s actual effect on women as workers. In Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty,38 decided only one year after Gilbert, the Court invalidated an
employer policy forcing pregnant women to take leave from work and then
denying them their previously accumulated seniority when bidding for new
positions thereafter. As the Court reconciled this position with Gilbert,
employers were not required to provide benefits to “one sex or the other ‘because

29. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1972); 37 FED. REG. 6836 (1972). On the advocacy before and after the
EEOC guidelines were issued, see Dinner, supra note 22, at 423-24.
30. 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974).
31. Reed purported to invalidate the Idaho statute on rational basis review, but, with hindsight,
the case is understood as having taken the first step towards intermediate scrutiny.
32. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974).
33. Id. at 497 n.20.
34. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
35. Id. at 133-40.
36. Id. at 140-46.
37. Id. at 146-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
506 n.3 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the ruling in Gilbert as a “notable exception” to the
Court’s usual “method of interpretation”).
38. 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977).
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of their differing roles in the scheme of human existence,’” but neither could they
“burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employment
opportunities.”39
Two other cases from this era illustrate the same theme. In Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur,40 decided the same term as Geduldig, the Court used the
due process clause to invalidate several school district policies forcing pregnant
teachers to leave work early in their pregnancies and allowing them to return
only three months after childbirth.41 To do so, the Court applied the nowdefunct irrebuttable presumption doctrine in conjunction with the emerging
right to privacy surrounding decisions related to reproduction.42 Public
employers could not arbitrarily assume that pregnancy and childbirth would
disable all women at fixed times and for a fixed duration.43 The following year,
the Court again struck down a one-size-fits-all approach to assessing pregnant
women’s capacity in Turner v. Department of Employment Security.44 There, the
Court struck down a Utah law prohibiting a pregnant woman from collecting
unemployment benefits from twelve weeks prior to her due date until six weeks
after she actually gave birth based on a conclusive presumption that she would
be unable to work during that period.45 The fatal error of the law was in using a
fixed marker of incapacity for all pregnant women despite the fact that “a
substantial number of women are fully capable of working well into their last
trimester of pregnancy and of resuming employment shortly after childbirth.”46
A woman who is able to work through pregnancy without missing a beat is
entitled to be judged on that basis, rather than on the experiences of pregnant
women generally.
Together, the Court’s pre-PDA precedents from the 1970s drew a line in the
sand: pregnant women were not entitled to any “special” benefits or treatment
based on their pregnancy; but neither could employers penalize those women
who were able to work while pregnant, with all the attendant benefits that
continued employment entails. To put it in the starkest terms, a pregnant worker
who could work like a man (or, to use the Court’s Geduldig nomenclature, a
nonpregnant person) had the right to continue to do so.
B. The Enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
The Court’s ruling in Gilbert spurred momentum in Congress to expand

39. Id.
40. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
41. Id.at 647-48. For an excellent discussion of the feminist litigation strategy in LaFleur, in which
women’s rights lawyers sought to integrate sex equality and reproductive liberty rights, and their
partial vindication in the Court’s decision, see generally Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur
Doctrine, 22 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 343 (2010).
42. 414 U.S. at 643-48. On the subsequent fall of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, see John
C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl L. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 1211, 1237–38 (1998) (noting that the Court “threw in the towel” on this doctrine, which was
awkwardly used to remedy “substantive concerns” with “procedural restrictions”).
43. 414 U.S. at 640.
44. 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
45. Id. at 46. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(h)(1) (1974).
46. 423 U.S. at 46.
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protections to pregnant workers beyond the limited set of rights recognized by
the Court.47 The Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers
proposed, and ultimately gained, a new law amending Title VII to ban
pregnancy discrimination as a species of sex discrimination.48 By March of 1977,
there was bipartisan support for the bill, which aimed to override the Court’s
decision in Gilbert.49 The bill heralded 86 bi-partisan co-sponsors when it was
introduced in March of 1977, and was enacted into law 19 months later on
October 31, 1978.50 The bill passed both houses of Congress by wide margins: 7511 in the Senate and 376-43 in the House.51 The limited opposition was “halfhearted and perfunctory.”52
Objections centered mostly on the law’s
implications for employer reimbursement for abortion and on the costs to
employers of compliance.53
The PDA was a swift rejection of the Court’s philosophy on pregnancy: the
idea that ignoring the status of pregnancy fully met an employer’s obligation to
pregnant workers. Instead, the Act was designed to “enable women to maintain
labor-force attachments throughout pregnancy and childbirth.”54 Toward that
end, it insisted that employers abandon express rules and policies that classified
on the basis of pregnancy, as well as stereotyped ways of thinking about
pregnant women as workers.55 Congress did not hide its disdain for the Gilbert
decision and its intent to override it.56 The Act amends the definition section of
Title VII by adding a new provision, as follows:
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ [in Title VII] include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or

47. See Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2009) (chronicling the passage of the
PDA).
48. Dinner, supra note 22, at 469-73.
49. 123 Cong. Rec. 6645 (1977); H.R. Res. 4357, 95th Cong. (1977).
50. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
51. 123 Cong. Rec. 29635, 29640-65 (1977); 124 Cong. Rec. H6862-70; 124 Cong. Rec. H6878, 124
Cong. Rec. 21421 (1978).
52. Pedriana, supra note 47, at 12.
53. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 15 n.
52 (2007). The final version of the Act contains an abortion neutrality provision relieving employers
of any obligation to provide health insurance coverage for abortion, with exceptions for medical
complications arising from abortion or where the life of the woman is at stake. Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
54. Dinner, supra note 22, at 484.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). See also H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 (Senate Committee report explaining that the Act was designed “to reflect
the ‘commonsense’ view and to insure that working women are protected against all forms of
employment discrimination based on sex”).
56. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 (1987) (observing that the PDA
unambiguously overturned Gilbert); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 678 (1983) (observing that the PDA unambiguously overturned Gilbert).
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inability to work.57

The Act contains two distinct clauses. The first clause marks a wholesale
rejection of the Court’s failure to recognize pregnancy discrimination as a form of
sex discrimination, declaring discrimination “because of or on the basis of
pregnancy. . .” to be a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.58 The structure
of the PDA is as an amendment to the definition section of the statute, defining
the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” “[f]or purposes of [Title
VII].”59 Notably, these two terms are not found, in this precise form, anywhere
else in the statute. They do appear, however, in the Gilbert decision. There, the
Court stated that the exclusion of pregnancy does not discriminate “on the basis
of sex”60 and found the pregnancy exclusion to be compatible with Congress’
command to prohibit discrimination “because of. . .sex. . .”61 Congress’ drafting
of the PDA—while odd in purporting to define statutory terms that do not
appear anywhere else in the statute—makes sense in light of the role the Gilbert
decision played in the enactment of the PDA. The Act was a response to that
decision, and the drafting choice reflects Congress’ intention to repudiate the
Gilbert approach to pregnancy discrimination.
The first clause of the PDA ensures that Title VII’s tool kit, with all of its
theories for challenging sex discrimination, is fully applicable to pregnancy
discrimination. Accordingly, a facial policy that discriminates on the basis of
pregnancy is invalid unless the employer proves that not being pregnant is a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). Intentional, but unadmitted, acts of
pregnancy discrimination can be challenged under either the pretext or mixed
motive model of disparate treatment. In theory, pregnancy discrimination may
also be challenged as systemic disparate treatment, although the small numbers
of pregnant women in the workplace may make this theory unavailable in
practice.62 The disparate impact theory is also applicable for pregnancy
discrimination, although, as we discuss below, it rarely succeeds in such claims.
Because clause one simply added pregnancy to Title VII’s existing structure,
its meaning has posed fewer interpretive problems than clause two. Clause two
has proven to be especially challenging because it is not modeled on any other
anti-discrimination provision in federal law. It provides that women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions “shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.”63 The relationship between clause
one and clause two might be viewed in a number of different ways. Clause two
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976).
61. Id. at 145 (ellipses in original).
62. The EEOC unsuccessfully attempted to bring such a suit in a high-profile pregnancy
discrimination case. See EEOC v. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that the
EEOC failed to provide sufficient statistical proof of a pattern and practice of pregnancy-based
discrimination). The Supreme Court added to the hurdles for litigants bringing a private class action
challenge in all systemic disparate treatment cases in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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might be described as: (1) setting the limits of what amounts to pregnancy
discrimination in clause one (e.g., defining what it means to discriminate on the
basis of pregnancy); (2) describing the remedy to a violation of clause one (e.g.,
once a plaintiff proves pregnancy discrimination, the remedy is to treat pregnant
women the same as others similar in their ability to work); (3) creating a defense
to a pregnancy discrimination claim (what might otherwise be pregnancy
discrimination is not unlawful if pregnant women are treated the same as others
similar in ability to work); or (4) establishing an independent violation of the
PDA if pregnant workers are treated worse than other workers similar in their
ability to work. The fourth approach best matches the text and legislative history
of the Act, as a response to Gilbert and an override of that decision. Although the
Supreme Court’s PDA decisions are most compatible with this interpretation,
lower federal courts have increasingly gravitated towards the first and second
approaches, tying the reach of the second clause to the scope of the first, instead
of treating clause two as sufficient to establish a violation of the Act. Properly
understood, the second clause creates a comparative right to accommodation.
Because clause one provides no absolute protection for pregnancy, clause two
has become an important source of PDA rights and the main game in litigation
under the PDA.
C. The PDA in the Supreme Court
Since the PDA’s enactment, only a handful of cases involving pregnancy
discrimination claims have reached the Supreme Court. Despite the Court’s
earlier track record on pregnancy discrimination, the Court’s PDA rulings have
taken a relatively strong reading of the Act. Perhaps ironically, but in keeping
with the Court’s trend of developing sex discrimination law through claims
brought by men, the Court’s first PDA case was a claim alleging pregnancy
discrimination against male employees. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC,64 male employees challenged the employer’s policy of
providing health insurance coverage for pregnancy and childbirth to its female
employees, but not to the wives of its male employees. The Court ruled that the
exclusion violated the PDA, since other health conditions of employees’ spouses
were covered.65
Although this decision is usually treated as inconsequential (apart from
illustrating the lengths to which the Court would go to conceptualize sex
discrimination as discrimination against men, even when it comes to pregnancy),
it establishes two important principles for our purposes. First, the Court
followed the broad wording of the Act, requiring pregnancy to be treated as well
as other medical conditions, despite the likelihood of a narrower intent of
Congress, since nothing in the legislative history suggested a concern for the
treatment of workers’ wives. Second, the ruling implicitly rejects a reading of the
second clause that would require proof of pregnancy-based animus to establish a
violation. After all, the employer did cover employees’ pregnancies—it was only
the pregnancies of the wives of male workers that were excluded. Rather than a

64. 462 U.S. 669 (1983)
65. Id. at 683-84.
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general animus toward pregnancy, the employer’s motivation was based on cost.
True to Congress’ rejection of Gilbert (where the policy was also defended based
on cost), the employer’s motivation could not salvage the policy.
A separate and more controversial issue in the early PDA litigation was
whether clause two foreclosed treating pregnant workers more generously than
other workers. This issue sparked a divisive tactical battle among women’s rights
advocates in the years soon after the PDA’s enactment. In a number of cases,
employers—either voluntarily or as required by state laws—provided benefits
and/or leave policies that were more generous for pregnancy than for other
conditions. The question was whether clause two of the PDA foreclosed such
different treatment. Feminist litigators and scholars differed on the answer to
this question. Although equal treatment—treating women and men alike for
work-related purposes—had generally been the rallying cry of second-wave
feminists, reflected in multiple legislative and judicial sex equality successes,66
cases of physical difference like pregnancy provoked profound disagreement.
One group argued for equal treatment—pregnant women would sink or swim
together with other similarly affected workers, but would avoid the harms of
marking pregnancy for special treatment.67 Others argued for a more substantive
approach to equality that would specifically accommodate pregnancy, regardless
of how other workers were treated, in order to attain equal workplace outcomes
for men and women who reproduce.68
This dispute played out in two high-profile cases in the 1980s, testing the
meaning of the PDA’s second clause. In Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm’r of Labor and
Industry,69 an employer challenged a Montana law requiring maternity leave,
alleging that it was inconsistent with the PDA’s guarantee that pregnant workers
be treated “the same as” other comparably disabled workers. The same question
was decided three years later in California Federal Savings v. Guerra,70 a case in
which the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the PDA preempted a
California law requiring employers to provide up to four months unpaid leave
for pregnancy- or childbirth-related disability. In Miller-Wohl, the Montana
Supreme Court endorsed an accommodation approach that permitted the state to
require maternity leave regardless of whether leave was provided for
comparably disabled workers.71 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this same
interpretation of the PDA in Guerra, concluding that, “Congress intended the
PDA to be ‘a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not
66. See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 34-49 (3rd ed.
2013) (describing the era of liberal feminism and the movement for equal treatment).
67. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982) [hereinafter Williams, The Equality Crisis]; Wendy W.
Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment,
Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513, 537-57 (1983);
Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J. 375, 426-30 (1981); see also CHAMALLAS,
supra note 66, at 55 (noting that the feminist divide in the pregnancy cases was “as much about
strategy as fundamental theory”).
69. 214 Mont. 238 (1984).
70. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
71. 214 Mont. at 259-60.
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a ceiling above which they may not rise.’”72 Thus, under clause two, employers
may treat pregnancy better than other disabling conditions, but may not treat it
any worse.73 The Court’s ruling effectively reads clause two as a vehicle for
protecting pregnant workers’ job security and benefits; not as a restraint on
measures taken by employers to make the workplace more hospitable to
pregnant women. The decision embodies a substantive equality approach to
pregnancy discrimination, prioritizing actual workplace security for pregnant
workers over formal neutrality.
In an alternative holding, the Court upheld the California law on the
additional grounds that it did not actually conflict with the PDA, even if it had
read the PDA to insist on formal neutrality between pregnancy and other
conditions.74 In the Court’s view, this was not a case in which “compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” nor an “inevitable
collision between the two schemes of regulation.”75 Rather, employers could
satisfy the California law by offering maternity leave, and are “free to give
comparable benefits to other disabled employees” if that were required by the
PDA.76 The alternative holding further strengthens the reading of clause two as a
mandate for the comparable treatment of pregnancy, without regard to the
employer’s reason for treating pregnancy less favorably than other conditions.
The following decade, the Court added to its robust PDA precedents.
International Union v. Johnson Controls involved a challenge to the validity of an
employer’s so-called “fetal protection” policy barring fertile women from
holding jobs in a battery manufacturing plant that involved exposure to lead.77
Before the enactment of Title VII in 1964, Johnson Controls had excluded women
completely from battery-manufacturing jobs.78 It then began to hire women into
these jobs; after 1977, it did so with a stern warning about the possible dangers of
lead exposure to an unborn child.79 In 1982, Johnson Controls shifted its policy
again to exclude “women who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing
children” from all jobs involving lead exposure, as well as all jobs in which they
could bid, bump, transfer, or be promoted into a job with lead exposure.80 This
change was prompted by tests showing elevated levels of lead in the blood of a
few women who became pregnant, although there was no proof that the high
72. 479 U.S. at 285. The appendix to the federal regulations on pregnancy discrimination
reinforces the Court’s view of the PDA as setting a floor for the treatment of pregnancy. A questionand-answer section following the substantive regulations states: “If, for example, a State law requires
an employer to pay a maximum of 26 weeks benefits for disabilities other than pregnancy-related
ones but only six weeks for pregnancy-related disabilities, the employer must provide benefits for the
additional weeks to an employee disabled by pregnancy-related conditions, up to the maximum
provided other disabled employees.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app., Q. 19 (2012).
73. The Court’s reasoning restricted an employer’s more favorable treatment of pregnancy to the
actual physically disabling period of pregnancy and recovery; it foreclosed differences in treatment
based on stereotypes about caretaking, apart from any actual impairment.
74. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 291.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 499 U.S. 187, 191 (1991).
78. Id. at 191.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 192.
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levels led to any injury or birth defect.81 Under the new policy, a woman was
deemed “capable of bearing children” unless her “inability to bear children [was]
medically documented.”82
The policy was challenged by several plaintiffs, including: a woman who
chose to be sterilized rather than lose her job; a 50-year-old woman who was
involuntarily transferred to a lower-paying job with no lead exposure; and a man
who asked to transfer out of a lead-exposure job because he wanted to start a
family, but was denied.83
A threshold issue in the case was whether the company’s policy constituted
facial sex discrimination. Johnson Controls had argued that the policy was sex
neutral because it did not exclude all women and was not motivated by animus
towards women, but a benevolent interest in protecting children.84 Remarkably,
the lower court agreed, treating the policy as unintentional discrimination
subject only to disparate impact challenge.85 Accordingly, the court applied the
more lenient business necessity defense instead of the tougher bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense.86
The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the policy was facially
discriminatory because it “classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing
capacity, rather than fertility alone.”87 The Court’s conclusion that the policy
constituted facial sex discrimination was “bolstered” by the PDA, which makes
clear that discrimination “based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face,
discrimination because of her sex.”88 Moreover, the Court continued, “the
absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy
into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.”89 The illegality of facial
discrimination “does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather
on the explicit terms of the discrimination.”90
Having found facial discrimination, the Court considered and rejected the
employer’s BFOQ defense, finding that female sterility was not “reasonably
necessary” to the “normal operation” of the business, since it was not necessary
to perform the job of making batteries.91 The Court explained that the BFOQ
defense operates no differently for pregnancy than it does for sex, seeing in the
PDA’s second clause “a BFOQ standard of its own: Unless pregnant employees
differ from others ‘in their ability or inability to work,’ they must be ‘treated the
same’ as other employees ‘for all employment-related purposes.’”92 The Court
cautioned against an interpretation that would “read the second clause out of the
81. Id. at 191-92.
82. Id. at 192.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 195-97.
85. Id. at 193.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 198.
88. Id. at 199.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 202-04 (distinguishing the present case from Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)).
92. Id. at 204.
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Act.”93
The decision necessarily rejects an approach that would limit pregnancy
discrimination to cases where the disfavored treatment of pregnancy is traceable
to animus. Under the Johnson Controls ruling, treating pregnancy worse than
other conditions with a similar effect on work violates the PDA even if the
employer has a “benign” reason for doing so.94
After a long hiatus from pregnancy discrimination cases, the Court decided
another one in 2009. In that case, AT&T v. Hulteen,95 the issue was whether
AT&T violated the PDA by paying retired female employees lower pensions
because they took unpaid pregnancy-related leaves between 1968 and 1974,
before passage of the PDA. These women lost service credit for the duration of
their leaves, while other workers who took disability leave during that time
period were given full service credit.96 Today, such a practice would violate the
PDA; back then, it was perfectly lawful. Because pensions are based on years of
service, women retiring long after the PDA’s enactment were still getting less
money every month because of AT&T’s past treatment of their pregnancy leaves.
The plaintiffs argued that the company’s reliance on differential service credits to
calculate pensions for their present retirement was an unlawful employment
practice.97
The majority sided with AT&T, ruling that the service credit system was not
the product of intent to discriminate, since the system was not unlawful at the
time and therefore was a “bona fide seniority system,” a defense to Title VII
claims.98 As Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissent, however, this ruling
extends the effects of Gilbert into another millennium, despite the clear intent of
Congress to repudiate it.99
It is too soon to say whether Hulteen is a blip on the screen—an anomalous
decision limited to its facts and best explained by the Court’s special solicitude
for employee reliance interests in seniority systems—or if it marks a backdoor
return to the pre-PDA, Gilbert approach to pregnancy discrimination. But apart
from that single case, and despite its inauspicious beginning in the early 1970s,
the Supreme Court in its post-PDA opinions has read and applied the statute
consistently with its plain meaning and purpose: to override Gilbert and secure
for pregnant workers at least the same kinds of treatment and adjustments made
for other conditions with a similar effect on work.
Cases outside the pregnancy context also reveal an appreciation for the
gender stereotyping and discrimination that working women face in relation to
pregnancy. While not a PDA case per se, Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs upheld the caretaking leave authorized by the Family Medical Leave Act as
a valid exercise of Congress’ power to remedy violations of the Fourteenth

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 205.
Id. at 198-99.
556 U.S. 701 (2009).
Id. at 706.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 707-715.
Id. at 719 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.100 The Court’s reasoning, which treats
mandatory gender-neutral caretaking leave as an appropriate remedy in light of
widespread discrimination and stereotyping against mothers as lacking a full
commitment to the workforce, shows sensitivity to the harmful and lasting
effects of stereotypes about pregnant women and mothers in the workplace.
II. THE PDA IN THE LOWER COURTS: FLASHBACKS TO GEDULDIG AND GILBERT
While the Supreme Court has paved the path for a robust interpretation of
the PDA, lower courts have not lived up to that promise. This section briefly
discusses the lower courts’ narrow readings of the PDA’s protections under
clause one, and then turns to their increasingly problematic interpretation of
clause two.
A. Clause One: Protecting the Status of Pregnancy, Not its Effects
What does it mean to discriminate because of pregnancy and conditions
related to it? This question is at the core of the first clause of the PDA, which
adds “pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions” to the list of bases
on which employers may not discriminate.
Like the other forms of
discrimination covered by Title VII, pregnancy discrimination that is not
embodied in a formal policy can be challenged under the first clause using either
the pretext model (it is more likely than not that the employer’s action would not
have been taken but for the employee’s pregnancy) or the mixed motive proof
structure (pregnancy was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision). But
pregnancy is a more complicated characteristic than sex or race in that it is both a
status and a physical condition with real (though variable) effects on work.
Courts understand the PDA’s first clause to disallow discrimination based on
status, but to allow it based on the effects of the condition itself. So while
“pregnancy” as status cannot be the reason (or a motivating factor) for the
employer’s action, the physical effects of pregnancy that interfere with work
capacity can be. Two classic cases illustrate this point.
In Troupe v. May Department Stores, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a
department store did not commit pregnancy discrimination when it fired a retail
sales clerk for excessive tardiness caused by morning sickness.101 The plaintiff
had no tardiness problems prior to experiencing pregnancy-related morning
sickness, but the store claimed that it would have fired any employee who had
similar tardiness problems and was about to take an extended medical leave.102
In affirming summary judgment for the employer, Judge Posner refused to see
the firing as pregnancy discrimination, absent proof that an otherwise similarly
situated, non-pregnant employee received better treatment:

100. 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding care-taking leave provision of FMLA against Eleventh
Amendment challenge on grounds that it was a congruent and proportional response under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to a state-sponsored history of discrimination against pregnant
women and mothers in the workplace); see also Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby:
Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871 (2006).
101. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
102. Id. at 738.
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We must imagine a hypothetical Mr. Troupe, who is as tardy as Ms. Troupe was,
also because of health problems, and who is about to take a protracted sick leave
growing out of those problems at an expense to Lord & Taylor equal to that of
Ms. Troupe’s maternity leave. If [the employer] would have fired our
hypothetical Mr. Troupe, this implies that it fired Ms. Troupe not because she
was pregnant but because she cost the company more than she was worth to
it.103

Although the PDA did not permit the store to fire Troupe simply for being
pregnant, it could fire her if her pregnancy interfered with her job performance,
as long as it would have done the same for other impaired workers with similar
job performance. The court saw its job as teasing out whether the employer is
responding to the work-related aspects of pregnancy or to the status of
pregnancy itself.104 Putting aside that courts have not been very skilled at
sussing out the difference, even this theoretical protection goes no further than
status.105
A second case, Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, further highlights the difficulty of
separating the status of pregnancy from its effects.106 The plaintiff was hired as a
part-time bank teller with the understanding that her job would entail heavy
seasonal work in the summer.107 After being hired, she learned she was pregnant
and disclosed both the fact of the pregnancy and her due date to her employer.
The employer fired her the next day. The plaintiff won her PDA case. But the
grounds on which she prevailed reveal the narrowness of the law’s protection.108
As the court saw it, the employer’s mistake was not in firing a pregnant
employee because childbirth interfered with requirements of the job – showing
up at work during the peak season – but in jumping to the conclusion that the
plaintiff would not show up for work around the time when she was expected to
give birth.109 The plaintiff had a right, the court explained, to an individualized
assessment of her capacity to work, and the employer’s assumption that she
would require a leave for childbirth reflected unlawful stereotypes about the
abilities of pregnant women generally.110 While the PDA permits employers to
“project the normal inconveniences of pregnancy and their secondary effects into
the future and take actions in accordance with and in proportion to those
predictions,” it cannot “take anticipatory action unless it has a good faith basis,
supported by sufficiently strong evidence, that the normal inconveniences of an
employee’s pregnancy will require special treatment.”111 Maldonado was thus
entitled to keep her job unless and until the employer had reason to know she

103. Id. at 738.
104. Id. at 736.
105. Scholars have been largely critical of Posner’s ruling. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Pregnancy,
Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 79-81 (1997); Joan C. Williams et al., I Just Need Water:
Pregnancy Accommodation after the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming
2014)
106. 186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999).
107. Id. at 764.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 766-68.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 767.
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would require a leave during the peak season—at which point it could have
permissibly fired her if it would have fired a non-pregnant worker in that
position who needed a leave. It strengthened Maldonado’s case that she had
mentioned the possibility of not carrying the pregnancy to term, and that, given
the early stage of the pregnancy, she might have lost the pregnancy
involuntarily.112 Most importantly, she had not yet asked for a maternity leave
when she was fired. The employer’s preemptive action therefore struck at “the
core of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,” which provides that “an employer
cannot discriminate against a pregnant employee simply because it believes
pregnancy might prevent the employee from doing her job.”113
Together, the two cases illustrate the limits of clause one of the PDA:
pregnancy discrimination, while a form of sex discrimination under Title VII,
occurs when an employer acts based on the status of pregnancy, as opposed to its
actual effects. Since employers may act based on pregnancy’s effects on work in
spite of its status, the Act’s prohibition on pregnancy discrimination leaves much
room for employers to take actions every bit as harmful to the ability of pregnant
women to maintain employment.
This status/effects dichotomy also plays out in the case law defining the
scope of protection for pregnancy-related conditions. According to the Senate
Report accompanying the PDA, the language, “related medical conditions” was
selected to encompass the full range of “physiological occurrences peculiar to
women.”114 However, the status/effects dichotomy has meant that workers with
pregnancy-related conditions have little help from the PDA when their
conditions impose costs or otherwise clash with workplace rules and structures.
For example, while employers may not punish a woman for being infertile
or undergoing treatment for it,115 courts have not interpreted the PDA to require
employers to pay the costs of medical procedures to facilitate pregnancy.
Challenges to insurance plans under the PDA for not covering infertility
treatments such as in vitro fertilization, a procedure only performed on women,
have not succeeded.116 In the same vein, although provisions in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act have now largely rendered this problem
obsolete,117 while the PDA forbids penalizing women for being fertile (Johnson

112. Id. at 767-68.
113. Id. at 761.
114. S. Rep. No. 95-331, at 3-4 (1977).
115. See, e.g., Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D.Ill.1994) (finding that the
inability to become pregnant is a “related medical condition” to pregnancy, such that the PDA
forbids firing an employee for undergoing fertility treatments that are only performed on women
seeking to become pregnant); Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the PDA
protects against discrimination for undergoing fertility treatments to become pregnant, but requiring
plaintiff to prove that she was fired not simply for the resulting absenteeism, but because her
absenteeism was caused by infertility treatments).
116. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that employer
health insurance policy denying insurance coverage for infertility procedures done only to women
did not violate the PDA); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir.
1996).
117. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 45
C.F.R. § 147 (2011); US Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., News Release of Jan. 20.
2012,http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html (requiring new and renewed
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Controls),118 it has been interpreted to permit employer health plans to deny
coverage of prescription contraceptives, used only by women, to avoid
pregnancy.119 Likewise, courts have interpreted the PDA to forbid employers
from penalizing a woman for lactating, but to permit employers to deny
requested accommodations to enable women to breastfeed or pump breast milk
during work hours.120 This problem too is now eased by the Affordable Care
Act, which requires reasonable accommodations for breastfeeding workers.121
But the courts’ treatment of discrimination claims by lactating mothers reveals
their limited vision of the PDA’s protections. Some courts have even interpreted
the PDA to allow women to be fired for requesting accommodations for
lactation, restricting the PDA’s protection to those lactating women who suffer in
silence.122
The cases on pregnancy and its related conditions read the PDA as drawing
a line between pregnancy’s status and effects. But in many instances, it is the
effects of pregnancy and related conditions that interfere with women’s equality
in the workplace.
The lower courts’ narrow conception of pregnancy
discrimination harkens back to a view of pregnancy that the PDA purported to
reject: a refusal to see a reproductive process unique to women as equivalent to a
sex-based classification. The courts’ reasoning in these cases echoes the implicit
rationale from Gilbert: that pregnancy is a voluntary condition and women bear
the burdens of that choice if becoming a mother is not compatible with the rigors
of the workplace. These cases do not live up to the PDA’s original promise—to

health plans to cover FDA-approved prescription contraceptive methods and counseling at no cost to
patients). See also Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the PDA does not
require employers to provide accommodations for breastfeeding/lactating mothers); McNill v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ( deciding that the PDA does not require
employers to provide accommodations for breastfeeding/lactating mothers); Wallace v. Pyro Mining
Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (finding that the PDA does not require employers to provide
accommodations for breastfeeding/lactating mothers). Courts have also denied accommodations to
breastfeeding workers under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See, e.g., Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49
F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
118. Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
119. In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007). District court
cases decided before Standridge, the only federal appellate ruling on the issue, are split. Compare
Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (holding that the PDA requires
coverage), Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that the
PDA requires coverage), and EEOC v. UPS, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001) (finding that
exclusion violates Title VII ban on sex discrimination) with Cummins v. State, No. 2002-cv-4201-JPG,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2005) (holding that the PDA does not require coverage).
120. See, e.g., EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that an
employer may not punish employee for lactating, a medical condition related to pregnancy under the
PDA, but is not required to provide special accommodations to pump breast milk during the work
day).
121. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
122. See, e.g., Fortier v. U.S. Steel Grp., No. 01-2029, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11788 (W.D. Pa. June 4,
2002) (rejecting PDA claim based on allegation that she was fired because of her intent to breastfeed);
Puente v. Ridge, 324 F. App’x 423 (5th Cir. 2009). On the challenges of bringing breastfeeding
discrimination claims, see generally Heather M. Kolinsky, Respecting Working Mothers with Infant
Children: The Need for Increased Federal Intervention to Develop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding
Culture in the United States, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 333 (2010); Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding
in the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471 (2001).
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secure women’s equality in the workplace while protecting their reproductive
rights to become mothers.
In theory, the availability of disparate impact challenges under the PDA
might reach employment policies and practices that make it difficult for pregnant
women to continue working, making up for the failure of intentional
discrimination theories under clause one to reach beyond penalizing pregnancy
as a status.123 Disparate impact claims might expose the “latent exclusionary
bias” against pregnant workers and force employers to redesign workplace
policies to be more inclusive for a diverse work force.124 But precedent has
shown disparate impact’s promise to be more theoretical than real in pregnancybased claims.
While the PDA’s definition of discrimination based on sex, amended to
encompass discrimination based on pregnancy, should make disparate impact
claims available to challenge workplace practices with a disparate impact on
pregnant women,125 plaintiffs have very rarely succeeded in bringing such
claims.126 The reasons for this range from judicial hostility to such claims as a
demand for preferential treatment,127 to restrictions on the type of practice
subject to challenge,128 to difficulty identifying the appropriate comparison group
and insufficient data to prove disparate impact at a particular workplace.129 The
federal government, litigating as an employer, has even argued that disparate

123. Disparate impact theory was first judicially recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), and later codified in the 1991 amendments to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
124. Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE
L.J. 929, 939 (1985); see also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
642, 660-65 (2001).
125. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (“disparate impact is a
permissible theory of liability under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as it is under other provisions
of Title VII.”). Clause two, entitling pregnant workers to be treated as well as workers with other
conditions similarly affecting, should not in any way foreclose disparate impact challenges to
pregnancy-neutral rules. Cf. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987)
(describing the PDA’s second clause as a floor but not a ceiling for the treatment of pregnant
workers).
126. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 701, 751
(2006) (noting that “pregnancy cases typically fail under the disparate impact approach”).
127. See, e.g., Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (characterizing disparate impact as a “permissible theory”
under the PDA as long as it is not used as a “warrant for favoritism” that might prevent employers
from treating pregnant workers “as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant
employees”).
128. See, e.g., Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs did not
identify a particular practice susceptible to disparate impact analysis); Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118
F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a lack of a part-time option is not an “employment
practice” subject to disparate impact challenge); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579,
583-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that disparate impact theory cannot be used to challenge legitimate job
requirements like attendance).
129. See, e.g., Maganuco v. Layden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1991); Lang v.
Star Herald, 107 F.3d 1308 (8th Cir. 1997) (treating employee’s claim that the employer was too small
for statistical analysis as a concession that “there is no evidence . . . of a disproportionately adverse
impact on pregnant women”); Ilhart v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (refusing, in disparate
impact case challenging the elimination of a part-time position, to take notice of studies showing that
the majority of part-time workers are women with child-care responsibilities).
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impact theory cannot be used at all in pregnancy discrimination cases.130 While
courts have not gone so far as banning such claims outright, they have been far
from receptive to them. For example, the Fifth Circuit, in Stout v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., refused to apply disparate impact theory to claims “in which the
plaintiff’s only challenge is that the amount of sick leave granted to employees is
insufficient to accommodate the time off required in a typical pregnancy.”131 “To
hold otherwise would be to transform the PDA into a guarantee of medical leave
for pregnant employees, something we have specifically held that the PDA does
not do.”132 Recent attacks on disparate impact theory in general, even outside of
the pregnancy context,133 make it even less likely that this doctrine will fill in the
gaps created by courts’ narrow approaches to proving discrimination because of
pregnancy under the PDA.
With clause one of the PDA mostly relegated to protection for pregnant
workers from being penalized for the status of pregnancy, workers seeking to
reconcile the demands of paid work with the effects of pregnancy have turned to
clause two of the PDA for recourse. On its terms, clause two should extend to
workers affected by pregnancy the most favorable treatment given other workers
with conditions having a similar effect on work. Here too, however, courts have
turned the PDA into a weak rule against animus targeting the status of
pregnancy per se.
B. Trouble in Clause Two: A Return to the Sui Generis Treatment of Pregnancy
While the courts have not done particularly well with clause one, the
biggest problems in the PDA case law in recent years have come by way of
clause two. In what appears to be a growing trend, courts have undercut
pregnant workers’ rights under clause two by carving out exceptions from the
classes of workers to which pregnant women may compare themselves.
A major focus in recent PDA litigation has been the validity of workplace
policies that provide for light-duty assignments for some workers, but not for
women with pregnancy-related limitations. These policies do not expressly
exclude pregnancy, but use criteria that render pregnancy ineligible. For
example, a typical light-duty policy offers light-duty assignments only for
workers with injuries sustained on-the-job.
For the most part, women
challenging light-duty policies have been unsuccessful unless they are able to

130. See, e.g., Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol.Dist., 867 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1988). In an
amicus brief, the United States argued that the PDA’s mandate of equal treatment was intended to
“eliminate the need for employees to rely on disparate impact analysis to support their Title VII
claims,” but also to preclude such reliance where it might be helpful. Id. at 978.
131. 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
132. Id. See also Sussman v. Salem, 153 F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (“This Court recognizes the
Supreme Court’s opinion that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was not intended to provide
accommodations to pregnant employees when such accommodations rise to the level of preferential
treatment.”).
133. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (holding that an employer who rejected
results of an employment test because it feared disparate impact litigation was liable for unlawful
disparate treatment); See also id. at 594-97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that disparate impact
doctrine itself might be subject to constitutional challenge for denying the equal protection rights of
non-beneficiaries).
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show discriminatory intent. Instead of following the plain language of clause
two, requiring pregnant workers to be treated as well as other workers “similar
in their ability to work,” lower courts are increasingly applying the McDonnell
Douglas framework to search for discriminatory intent behind the policy.134
The decision to apply the pretext framework in these cases, instead of a
straightforward comparative right to accommodation for pregnant workers, is
compounded by additional hurdles courts set up for plaintiffs. For example,
courts have held that light-duty plaintiffs have failed to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination because a woman with an off-the-job injury was not
“qualified” for light-duty policy that only applied to on-the-job injuries.135 This
reasoning effectively bars pregnant workers from challenging light-duty policies
under the PDA. Courts have also cut short light-duty challenges on the grounds
that the pregnant plaintiff could not identify a similarly situated worker who
received the benefit she was denied—the fourth prong of the prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas—since no other off-duty injuries were treated better.136
Even if plaintiffs survive the prima facie stage, courts accept the policy itself as
the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for denying the light-duty
request. When courts allow the rule to defend itself, as they have done in these
cases, they deny the plaintiff the opportunity even to offer evidence of
discriminatory intent—which, we contend, courts should not have been looking
for in the first place. This approach is especially damning when it insulates a
formal policy that will continue to have an impact on other pregnant women,
rather than an isolated instance of disparate treatment.
A typical light-duty case is Reeves v. Swift Transportation Co. Amanda Reeves
was an over-the-road truck driver for Swift Transportation.137 When Reeves
applied for the job, she represented that she could lift seventy-five pounds (sixty

134. The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green laid out a proof structure to be used
in cases when the plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination primarily through circumstantial evidence.
See 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Courts could also undertake mixed-motive analysis, first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and later codified with
modifications by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012), in
which case plaintiffs would have to prove that pregnancy was “a motivating factor” in adoption of
the policy or its application.
135. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that
with respect to the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test: “There is no dispute that Appellant
was no longer qualified to work as a nurse’s assistant. The lifting restriction imposed on Appellant
clearly prevented her from performing the responsibilities required of this position.”) See also
Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138
F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998) (agreeing with the district court’s finding that the plaintiff failed to show
she was “qualified for transfer into a light-duty position, i.e., that she sustained a work related
injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136. See Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208; see also Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313 (noting, with respect to the fourth
prong of McDonnell Douglas, that the “correct comparison is between Appellant and other employees
who suffer non-occupational disabilities, not between Appellant and employees who are injured on
the job”). But see EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.7 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“If a plaintiff is compared only to non-pregnant employees injured off the job, her case would be
‘short circuited’ at the prima facie stage . . . . The better approach would be to hold that a plaintiff has
satisfied the fourth element of her prima facie case by showing that she was treated differently than a
non-pregnant, temporarily-disabled employee.”).
137. 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006).
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over her head) and carry it for fifty-six feet.138 After three months on the job,
Reeves discovered she was pregnant. She had never, up to that point, had to
unload a truck herself or carry anything heavy.139 Her doctor wrote a note
restricting her to light work, which included lifting no more than twenty
pounds.140 Her supervisor reviewed the note, declared they had no “light work”
for her to do, and sent her home.141 She requested light work daily – and was
repeatedly denied based on the company’s policy that light work could only be
assigned to those disabled by on-the-job injuries.142 The company eventually
fired her for failing to work at full capacity.143
In her PDA lawsuit, Reeves argued that the light-duty policy was per se
discriminatory because no pregnant woman could qualify for light work
regardless of whether her level of incapacity was the same as workers who did
qualify.144 The court rejected this theory and turned, instead, to the McDonnell
Douglas framework, which asks first for proof by the plaintiff of a prima facie
case of discrimination, then for the production of evidence by the employer
pointing to a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action.145 It
assumed that Reeves had met her prima facie burden, and then considered
whether Swift’s ostensibly legitimate explanation—its “pregnancy blind” lightduty policy—was a pretext for discrimination.146 The court granted summary
judgment to Swift because Reeves could not prove that Swift adopted the policy
in order to disadvantage pregnant women.147
Pregnant plaintiffs have managed to prevail in two light-duty cases. In
Lochren v. Suffolk County, female police officers won a jury trial in their challenge
to a light-duty policy with an on-the-job restriction.148 But here, the plaintiffs had
evidence of longstanding and persistent animus against female officers and the
inconsistent application of the ostensibly neutral light-duty policy.149 The same
county was sued again a few years later by female park police officers,
challenging an identical policy, resulting in a favorable settlement for the
plaintiffs.150

138. Id. at 638.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 639.
143. Id.
144. Reeves had only worked for the employer for three months and thus did not meet the
eligibility requirements for FMLA leave. Id.
145. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
146. Reeves, 446 F.3d at 641-42. The court did not take Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th
Cir.1996), head on because it limited its comparison-group analysis to the pretext stage of the case. Id.
at 641 n.1.
147. Id. at 641-43.
148. See Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-3925(ARL)., 2008 WL 2039458 (E.D.N.Y. May 9,
2008); see also Joanna Grossman, A Big Win for Pregnant Police Officers: A Jury Finds a New York
County’s Police Department Liable for Failing To Accommodate Pregnancy-Related Disability, FINDLAW’S
WRIT (June 27, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20060627.html (describing the jury
verdict in Lochren v. Cnty of Suffolk).
149. See Grossman, supra note 148.
150. Germain v. Cnty. of Suffolk., 672 F. Supp. 2d 319 (2009).
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Even when plaintiffs prevail, as they did in Lochren, the winning theory has
been based on an unduly narrow reading of clause two. The Lochren plaintiffs
prevailed only because they mustered strong evidence of longstanding and clear
animus against female police officers generally, and pregnant police officers in
particular.151 But the second clause of the PDA is meant to guarantee equal
treatment regardless of an employer’s motive.
By defining the comparison pool for pregnant workers to exclude a favored
class of workers (such as those injured on the job), courts construe pregnant
workers’ requests for light-duty work as a demand for “special treatment.”152
While there is some earlier authority rejecting this kind of approach to PDA
claims challenging pregnant workers’ exclusion from light-duty work,153 in
Reeves and like cases from other circuits, the plaintiff’s claim is characterized as a
demand for “preferential treatment.”154 Under this approach, the employer can
select any comparison group by which to establish that the pregnant woman has
received equal treatment as long as the choice does not reflect a discriminatory
motive. By permitting the employer to pick and choose among comparably
disabled workers, the court fundamentally misconstrues clause two of the PDA,
which by its terms entitles pregnant women to work on the same terms as more
favorably-treated workers similarly restricted in their capacity to work.
Two recent cases, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.155 and Serednyj v. Beverly
Healthcare, LLC,156 illustrate how this approach is now effectively nullifying the
second clause of the PDA.
Peggy Young was hired by UPS in 1999.157 She began driving a delivery
truck for the company in 2002. As an “air driver,” charged with delivering
151. See Grossman, supra note 148.
152. See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998); Reeves v. Swift
Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 2006).
153. The leading case rejecting this kind of parsing of comparators under clause two of the PDA is
Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for employer
because district court had incorrectly limited the class of “similarly-situated” employees to those also
injured off-the-job); accord Villanueva v. Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 04–258–JJF.,
2007 U.S. Dist. WL 188111, at *5 n.4 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2007) (holding that pregnant patient care
technician who was denied light duty established a prima facie case even though her medical
restrictions differed from those of employees granted light duty); Sumner v. Wayne Cnty., 94 F. Supp.
2d 822, 826 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (finding that a police officer fired for violating department’s no-leave
policy for probationary employees after taking time off to give birth was “similarly situated” to male
officer granted longer probationary period after sick leave for on-the-job injury; both were
“temporarily disabled while on probation”). See also Jamie L. Clanton, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy
Discrimination at Work: Interpreting the PDA To “Mean What It Says,” 86 IOWA L. REV. 703, 724-33 (2001)
(defending the reasoning of Ensley-Gaines as grounded in the text and legislative history of the PDA).
However, the same Circuit that decided Ensley-Gaines later indirectly critiqued its reasoning in Reeves.
See Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006).
154. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Appellee, however,
was under no obligation to extend this accommodation to pregnant employees. The PDA does not
require that employers give preferential treatment to pregnant employees.”) (emphasis added); Urbano
v. Cont’l Airlines, 138 F.3d at 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Urbano’s claim is thus not a request for relief from
discrimination, but rather a demand for preferential treatment; it is a demand not satisfied by the
PDA.”) (emphasis added).
155. 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013).
156. 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011).
157. 707 F.3d at 440.
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packages that came via air rather than ground delivery, Young typically carried
lighter letters and packs. Young’s job description, however, required her to be
able to lift and maneuver packages weighing up to 70 pounds, and assist with
movement of packages up to 150 pounds.158 Young was covered by a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), which required UPS to provide temporary, lightduty work assignments to employees who could not perform their regular jobs
due to an on-the-job injury.159 The CBA also extended light-duty work to drivers
who are legally prohibited from driving because they either failed a required
medical exam or lost their driver’s license.160 Beyond the requirements of the
CBA, UPS had a policy to permit light-duty assignments when “an employee has
a qualifying disability within the meaning of the ADA which prevents him/her
from being able to perform some aspects of his/her job.”161 Because women with
pregnancy-related disability do not fall into any of these categories,162 they are
“permitted to continue working as long as they wanted to during their
pregnancies, unless and until the employee presented a doctor’s note or other
medical certification that she had a restriction that rendered her unable to
perform the essential aspects of the job.”163
Young sought and received several short-term leaves of absence as she went
through three rounds of in vitro fertilization.164 When she finally became
pregnant during the third round, her doctor wrote a note recommending that she
lift no more than 20 pounds during the first half of her pregnancy and no more
than 10 pounds thereafter.165 The company decided that it could not allow her to
continue working since she was not capable of performing the lifting described
in the list of essential job functions for her position.166 Young had already used
up all available medical leave, so she was put on a leave of absence with no pay
and no medical coverage.167 She returned to work two months after giving birth
in 2007.168
Young filed a lawsuit with claims for sex and pregnancy discrimination.
The court rejected Young’s argument that it facially discriminated against
pregnant employees by excluding pregnancy from eligibility for light-duty
assignments.169
Because the policy is “pregnancy-blind” and offers
accommodations on the basis of “gender-neutral criteria,” the court refused to

158. Id. at 439.
159. Id. at 439-40.
160. Id. at 440.
161. Young v. U.P.S., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14266, at *5-6 (D. MD Feb. 14, 2011).
162. Courts have consistently interpreted the ADA to exclude normal pregnancy as a covered
disability. See, e.g., Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (noting
that “the majority of federal courts hold that pregnancy-related complications do not constitute a
disability under the ADA”); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 474 (D. Kan.
1996).
163. Young, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7.
164. Young, 707 F.3d at 440.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 441.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 442.
169. Id. at 446-47.
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treat the policy as facially discriminatory or as raising an inference of pregnancy
discrimination.170
The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis and concluded
that Young did not establish that she met the fourth element of the prima facie
case – that a “similarly situated employee” was treated differently.171 Although
the company’s policies accommodated a wide range of conditions, from high
blood pressure and diabetes to drunk driving convictions, the court ruled that
Young could not use anyone who was eligible for ADA accommodation or had
lost their legal ability to drive as a comparator in the PDA claim.172 There is no
similarity, the court explained, between a driver who suffers “from a legal
obstacle to their operation of a vehicle” and a woman whose pregnancy poses “a
physical impairment that stymied her ability to lift.”173 The court dismissed
without discussing the possibility that an employee entitled to accommodation
under the ADA could be an appropriate comparator for Young.174 The court
effectively read a requirement of pregnancy-based animus into clause two:
It is important here to recall the objective of this element of the prima facie case: to
discern whether a reasonable inference can be drawn that the employer has
animus directed specifically at pregnant women. When an employer grants
pregnant employees and some class of non-pregnant employees equally harsh
terms, it undermines such an inference. In such circumstances, an employer
might have some form of animus that is not to be applauded, but the animus is
not directed towards a protected trait and, consequently, is not actionable.175

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling as well as
its reasoning.176 Despite acknowledging that the second clause of the PDA “can
be read broadly,” it chose not to give it such effect.177 The court expressly
rejected the idea that the second clause of the PDA creates “a distinct and
independent cause of action.”178 The court rejected what it saw as the
transformation of “an antidiscrimination statute into a requirement to provide
accommodation to pregnant employees, perhaps even at the expense of other,
nonpregnant employees.”179
Another recent case, Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, adds to the trend to
effectively nullify clause two.180 Victoria Serednyj was employed as an activity
director in a nursing home beginning in August 2006.181 As with many jobs in
long-term care facilities, Serednyj’s stated job duties included “some physically

170.
171.
2011).
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 450.
Young v. U.P.S., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14266, at *37-42 (D. Md. Feb. 14,
Id. at *38-42.
Id. at *40.
Id. at *38-40.
Id. at *41.
Young v. U.P.S., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id. at 448. Young filed a petition for certiorari, which has not yet been ruled upon.
656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 545.
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strenuous functions”—such as walking, climbing, bending, and lifting—related
to transporting residents to their activities, rearranging furniture, and shopping
for supplies.182 Her typical workday, however, involved only miniscule amounts
of time on such tasks, and coworkers often helped her with them.183 Serednyj
learned she was pregnant in January, 2007, and began to experience pregnancyrelated complications soon thereafter.184 After a two-week stint on bed rest,
Serednyj’s doctor restricted her to light duty work.185 The company’s policy was
to provide light-duty accommodations only to individuals with a disability
under the ADA or an on-the-job injury.186 Beverly Healthcare denied her request
for light duty, notwithstanding the proclaimed willingness of her coworkers to
help out.187 Because she had not worked for the company long enough to qualify
for leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, she was fired.188
The court considered both the mixed-motive and pretext models for
proving discrimination in denying the PDA claim.189 Rejecting the argument that
the light-duty policy was itself direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination, the
court ruled that the policy “complies with the PDA because it does, in fact, treat
nonpregnant employees the same as pregnant employees—both are denied an
accommodation of light duty work for non-work-related injuries.”190
The reasoning in these cases, legitimizing any differential accommodation
of workers that can be explained on a pregnancy-neutral basis, effectively
collapses clause two of the PDA into clause one. The result is to make it virtually
impossible for pregnant workers to challenge the more favorable treatment of
other groups of workers with conditions that have a similar effect on work. The
effect on pregnant workers’ PDA rights has become even more draconian as a
result of recent amendments to the ADA, which have expanded the pool of
workers entitled to accommodations under the ADA.
C. The Expanded ADA and the Contracting PDA
In an odd confluence of poorly-reasoned PDA cases and a well-intentioned
congressional override of restrictive judicial interpretations of the ADA, recent
developments in disability law are now exacerbating the problems created by the
PDA cases discussed above. The ADA provides that individuals with a
“disability” who are “otherwise qualified” have the right to reasonable
accommodations that do not impose an undue hardship on the employer.191 A

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 545-46.
186. Id. at 546.
187. Id.at 545-46.
188. Id. at 546-47.
189. Id. at 547-52.
190. Id. at 548. The court’s implicit assumption that a mixed-motive challenge requires “direct
evidence” of discrimination is itself bizarre, since the Supreme Court rejected any direct evidence
requirement for proof of a discriminatory “motivating factor” under the 1991 Amendments to Title
VII. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 91, 102 (2003).
191. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities.”192 While this directive might itself seem like a
good fit for pregnant workers whose pregnancies or related conditions require
reasonable accommodations in order for them to continue to work, courts and
the EEOC have consistently refused to regard normal pregnancy as an
“impairment” under the Act.193 The more troubling development for pregnant
workers, however, is that the recent expansion of ADA rights combined with the
trend in the PDA cases is now adding to the hurdles facing pregnant workers
seeking to secure accommodation rights through the PDA.
In 2008, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act (ADAAA), in response to a number of Supreme Court decisions taking a
restrictive view of the scope of the ADA.194 The Amendments expand the
definition of “impairment” to include not only conditions that interfere with
“activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives,” but also
more routine, work-related tasks such as standing, lifting, or bending.195 The
EEOC regulations interpreting the Act state that an impairment “need not
prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a
major life activity,” and that the “substantially limits” requirement is “not meant
to be a demanding standard.”196 As an example of an impairment that would
qualify for reasonable accommodations under the Act, the EEOC’s interpretive
guidance describes someone with a “20-pound lifting restriction that lasts or is
expected to last for several months.”197
The ADAAA, as interpreted by the EEOC, should also lift the duration
requirements many courts had imposed on the definition of disability. Although
the statute never specified a minimum period of disability, nor required it to be
permanent or indefinite, many courts had imposed a requirement of permanence
or long-term impact under the ADA.198 The ADAAA, like the original ADA,
does not explicitly address duration, but the EEOC has interpreted its mandate
for “broad coverage” to mean that short-term disabilities may be covered. In one

192. Id. at § 12102(2)(A).
193. EEOC, Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. § 1630.2(h), (j) (1991); see also Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 553 (7th
Cir. 2011) (collecting cases where the court has refused to acknowledge pregnancy as a physical
impairment).
194. Among the decisions overruled are Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471(1999);
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
196. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1991).
197. EEOC, Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. § 1630 (2012).
198. Courts considered duration of the disability as a factor in determining whether it substantially
limited a major life activity. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Evans v.
City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Jonathan R. Mook, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS § 902.4(d) (2013) (“Although short-term, temporary
restrictions generally are not substantially limiting, an impairment does not necessarily have to be
permanent to rise to the level of a disability. Some conditions may be long-term, or potentially longterm, in that their duration is indefinite and unknowable or is expected to be at least several months.
Such conditions, if severe, may constitute disabilities . . . despite the prognosis for full recovery at
some indeterminable point in the future.”).
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“rule of construction,” the regulations provide that the “effects of an impairment
lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting,”
and therefore may qualify as an “impairment.”199 The ADAAA also modified
other aspects of the standard to enlarge the class of individuals covered.200
One thing that has not changed with the ADAAA, so far at least, is the
exclusion of normal pregnancy under the Act, despite its even more comfortable
fit with the expanded coverage to encompass short-term disabilities, even those
which only manifest as a lifting restriction. Nevertheless, the EEOC, in an
interpretive guidance of the ADAAA, continues to adhere to the position that
normal pregnancy is not a disability and need not be accommodated under the
ADA.201
In addition to perpetuating the exclusion of workers impaired by pregnancy
and related conditions from any right to accommodation directly under the
ADA, the amendments are also (unintentionally) interfering with pregnant
workers’ accommodation rights under the PDA. Although the ADAAA should
help pregnant women by creating an expanded class of persons entitled to
workplace accommodations to whom pregnant workers could compare
themselves, cases like Reeves,202 Young,203 and Serednyj204 instead make pregnant
women worse off by eliminating an even broader class of comparators.
The reasoning of these courts, that ADA accommodations are not
comparable since they are required by law, defies the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Guerra.205 The Court’s alternative ruling in that case forbade employers from
hiding behind another statutory mandate as an excuse to treat one group of
comparably disabled workers better than another in violation of the PDA.206 As
the Court explained, California employers who were forced to provide maternity
leave by state law still could have complied with the PDA, had the Court
interpreted it to require non-pregnancy disabilities to be treated as well as
pregnancy, by extending leave and reinstatement rights to both groups.207
Likewise, employers should not be able to hide behind the ADA to excuse a
refusal to give pregnant women the same accommodations if they are similar in
their ability to work. The employer’s motive for offering accommodations to one
group but not another has no proper place in courts’ analysis under clause two,

199. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2012).
200. For detailed discussion of the changes, see Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the
Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 460-66 (2012) (addressing the expanded
scope of the ADA). See also Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 964-65
(2013); Williams et al., supra note 105, at 20-30.
201. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. at 378 (2011) (failing to include pregnancy as an impairment in
the ADA).
202. Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006).
203. Young v. U.P.S., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013).
204. Serednyj v. Beverly Health Care, LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011).
205. Cal. Fed. Savings v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
206. See id. at 291 (explaining that compliance with both federal and state law is possible and thus
one law does not trump the other).
207. Id. at 290-91.
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which makes similarity in ability to work the only relevant factor.208
Part of the resistance to comparing pregnant workers to workers
accommodated under the ADA may be an implicit, but unwarranted, distinction
in the presumed duration of ADA-qualified disabilities compared to pregnancy,
a temporary condition. Courts have generally construed the ADA to exclude
temporary disabilities, at least prior to the changes brought about by the 2008
Amendments. Although the text of the PDA does not impose any kind of
duration requirement on a worker’s inability to work in extending similar
treatment to pregnant women, terminology analogizing pregnancy and related
conditions to temporary disabilities has crept into the PDA lexicon. The early
EEOC regulations, some of the legislative history behind the PDA, and some
court opinions describing the PDA have all explained the Act as extending to
pregnancy the same level of benefits and accommodations as are available for
other temporary disabilities.209 In viewing ADA-accommodated disabilities as
not comparable to pregnancy, courts may be surreptitiously limiting the scope of
the PDA’s clause two, making pregnancy comparable only to temporary
conditions. This kind of slicing and dicing of the class of comparators whom
courts will analogize to pregnant workers–e.g., limiting the class of comparable
workers to those with only temporary conditions—is part and parcel of the
overly restrictive reading courts are giving clause two of the PDA.
The PDA itself, however, does not tie pregnant workers’ treatment to that of
workers with only temporary disabilities, but rather, to workers who are similar
in their ability to work. A natural reading of that language would focus on
present work capacity, and would include workers with similar capacity at the
time accommodations/benefits are given, regardless of the expected duration of
their impairment. For example, a person with multiple sclerosis and a person
with a temporarily strained back might both be proper comparators, if similar to
a pregnant worker in ability to work.
In our view, the legislative history’s comparison of pregnancy to other
temporary disabilities should not, and never was intended to, exclude
comparisons to disabilities of permanent or indefinite duration. Rather,
references to temporary disabilities were made because, at the time the PDA was
enacted, temporary disabilities were the kinds of conditions employers were
accommodating.210 Until passage of the ADA, workplaces generally made few if

208. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (“women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes. . .as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work”).
209. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972) (“Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy for all
job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such. . . .”); H.R. Rep. No.
948(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750 (“The EEOC Guidelines . . . require employers to
treat disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth and
recovery therefrom as all other temporary disabilities.”); 29 C.F.R. 1604 app. Question 5 at 200 (2013)
(Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act) (“An employer is required to treat an
employee temporarily unable to perform the functions of her job because of her pregnancy-related
condition in the same manner as it treats other temporarily disabled employees, whether by
providing modified tasks, alternative assignments, disability leaves, leaves without pay, etc.”); see
Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-41 (1976) (quoting temporary disability language from EEOC
Guidelines).
210. See Widiss, supra note 200, at 986-88 (discussing the expansion of employer benefits for
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any provisions for workers with lasting disabilities who required
accommodations to continue work.211 When the PDA was conceived, to the
extent employers were doing anything for disabilities, so as to enable pregnant
workers to use them as a benchmark for comparison, it was through policies on
temporary disabilities, such as the plans at issue in both Geduldig and Gilbert.212
Those plans, which excluded pregnancy, gave leaves of a limited duration, and
accompanying reinstatement rights, designed to accommodate workers with
temporary disabilities. In drafting and enacting the PDA to overturn these
decisions, the primary focus was on the kind of fact pattern at issue in these
cases, as evidenced by Congress’ choice of language.213 The PDA came to be
described as a mandate to treat pregnancy as well as other temporary disabilities
because those were the kinds of conditions at the time that employers were
treating more favorably. Just like Gilbert drove the terminology used in the PDA,
the Gilbert fact pattern shaped descriptions of the PDA’s impact in highlighting
the analogy to temporary disabilities.
But the text of the PDA is not so limited. The plain language of the PDA
makes an employee’s ability to work the only reference point for drawing
comparisons. And of course, saying that the Act mandates treating pregnancy as
well as temporary disabilities in no way implies that pregnancy may be treated
worse than disabilities that are not temporary. Now that employers must, by
law, make reasonable accommodations for disabilities of greater duration, the
PDA, by design, should extend equal benefits and accommodations to pregnant
workers with a similar work capacity. The courts that are now refusing to allow
pregnant workers to compare themselves to ADA-accommodated workers may
be, incorrectly, locked into a default categorization of pregnancy as only
analogous to temporary disabilities, unduly narrowing the class of appropriate
comparators.
To the extent that the default restriction of comparators to only temporary
disabilities has been limiting courts’ views of the proper scope of PDA rights,
and blocking comparisons to ADA-accommodated disabilities, that particular set
of blinders should be lifted now that the 2008 Amendments have clarified that
ADA accommodations are required for temporary as well as more lasting
impairments.214 So far, however, the extension of the ADA to temporary
disabilities has not made a difference in how courts view the PDA in relation to
the ADA. In the cases discussed above, courts have refused, with little or no
analysis, to use ADA-mandated accommodations as a baseline for pregnant
workers similar in ability to work, despite the 2008 Amendments. Instead, they
insist on characterizing policies to accommodate ADA-qualified disabilities and
on-the-job injuries, but not pregnancy, as “pregnancy neutral,” since not based
workers with temporary disabilities, except for pregnancy, which was often excluded, during the
years leading up to enactment of the PDA).
211. See, e.g., Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 Ga.
L. Rev. 27, 42-63 (2000) (detailing the history of discrimination against disabled persons, to which the
ADA was responding).
212. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 486-89; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128.
213. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra (pointing out that the terms defined in the PDA do
not appear elsewhere in Title VII, but do appear in the Gilbert decision).
214. See text accompanying notes 198-200 supra.
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on animus against pregnant workers.
The upshot is that courts are effectively draining clause two of any content,
and failing to see that in continuing to separate pregnancy from a class of other
conditions, even broader since 2008, similarly affecting work, they are
resuscitating the very gender ideology about pregnancy and work at the heart of
the Gilbert decision that the PDA sought to override. The next section takes a
step back to explore how the PDA cases fit into broader trends in employment
discrimination law, and delves into the gender ideology behind the
developments in the PDA case law.
III. PUTTING THE PDA’S FAILURES INTO A BROADER LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
Taking a step back, the problems courts have created in the PDA case law
resonate with the troubles of discrimination law more generally. The doctrinal
failures of the PDA share some common themes with the rest of discrimination
law. And yet, while the PDA’s fault-lines have antecedents in the broader law of
discrimination, the PDA’s failings nevertheless stand out, in light of the statute’s
text and history. Their emergence in the PDA case law reflects a distinctive
gender ideology about pregnancy and work, and by extension, motherhood and
work.
A. Amplifying the Anti-Plaintiff Trends in Employment Discrimination Law
One point of overlap between the PDA and other areas of employment
discrimination law is a resistance to so-called “bootstrapping” – using logic and
principled reasoning to apply the law to an area that the legislature had
specifically intended to exclude. The anti-bootstrapping flag gets raised often in
discrimination law – perhaps most prominently in cutting short the reach of
gender stereotyping theory to ensure that sexual orientation discrimination
remains outside the boundaries of a claim for sex-based discrimination. While
acknowledging that the logic of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,215 which recognized
gender stereotyping as a form of sex discrimination, may encompass negative
reactions to a gay or lesbian employee for failing to conform to the expectations
for how a “real” man or woman should conduct their sex life, courts have
insisted that Congress did not intend to address sexual orientation
discrimination when it enacted Title VII.216 Accordingly, they reason, it is
necessary to preserve a line between sex and sexual orientation bias in order to
prevent this kind of bootstrapping of claims. A similar fate has befallen pay
discrimination claims under Title VII’s disparate impact claim. Because Congress
never intended to mandate comparable worth, courts have cut short employees’
ability to use disparate impact claims to challenge pay disparities, seeing these
claims as heading down a slippery path that might end in comparable worth.217
215. 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989).
216. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 225 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination applies only to
gender discrimination and does not include discrimination of homosexuality).
217. See, e.g., Am. Nurses’ Ass’n v. Ill., 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the association
had no cause of action based solely on comparable worth, but that intentional discrimination
sufficient to state a sex discrimination cause of action had been alleged).
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Similarly, the recent PDA decisions, discussed above, reject what the courts
see as bootstrapping accommodations for pregnant workers onto the legs of the
ADA. Under this reasoning, since Congress never intended the PDA to
affirmatively guarantee any set level of benefits or accommodations, such as paid
maternity leave or sick leave to pregnant workers, and since Congress intended
to exclude normal pregnancy from the disabilities covered by the ADA, using the
expanded ADA to achieve equivalent results would be tantamount to
bootstrapping the claims of pregnant women onto the framework of the ADA.
This interpretation of the PDA, as a blank slate that does not in itself guarantee
substantive benefits for pregnancy, reflects an over-simplified, reductionist view
of the feminist movement behind the PDA. As Deborah Dinner has shown,
feminists actually pursued a more substantive and progressive agenda in
pushing for the Act than the more hollow “formal equality” commonly
attributed to the law’s supporters.218
By invoking the bootstrapping label, courts can halt the reach and logic of
discrimination law without acknowledging the ideology or policy choices behind
their decisions.219 The invocation of bootstrapping saddles the plaintiff with an
activist, sleight-of-hand litigation tactic while the judge plays the role of neutral
guardian of legislative intent. Closer inspection of the anti-bootstrapping move,
however, reveals that it is itself a substantive choice. The logic of statutory
language often extends beyond the specific intentions of the legislature, as Justice
Scalia recognized in the Oncale decision,220 when that Court held that Title VII
reaches male-male sexual harassment despite Congress’s lack of intent to
regulate such conduct when it enacted Title VII. The bootstrapping flag is raised
selectively, masking interpretive choices. A similarly false fidelity to legislative
intent was espoused in Gilbert itself, wherein the Court purported to be
constrained by Congress’ traditional understanding of sex discrimination.221 A
recent article by Cary Franklin shows how that “traditional” understanding was
itself an invention, masking normative choices in interpreting the meaning and
scope of the statute’s prohibition.222
The question of which substantive values and policy choices underlie the
bootstrapping objection merges into a second shared theme in the PDA and the
rest of discrimination law: judicial resistance to using discrimination law in a
way that appears to enforce accommodation mandates. The liberal equal
treatment model that dominates discrimination law in the U.S. aspires to deliver
only the same treatment for similarly situated persons, stopping short of

218. On this history, see generally Dinner, supra note 22 (unearthing the more complicated feminist
history behind the PDA than the liberal feminist agenda of minimizing the significance of pregnancy
in relation to work and rejecting “special” treatment for women).
219. See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205 (2009) (exposing
how courts’ resistance to bootstrapping masks a double standard that selectively raises sexual
orientation—gay/lesbian orientation, but not heterosexual orientation—as a bar to recognizing a
claim of gender stereotyping).
220. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
221. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137-40 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
222. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1307, 1358-66 (2012).
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requiring any structural changes that would enable the members of protected
groups to thrive. In specifying discrete protected classes, discrimination law
identifies certain status-based identity characteristics that may not be used to
deny equal treatment. Clause one of the PDA recognizes pregnancy as such a
status. The judicial tilt towards formal equality is so strong in U.S. law that
clause two’s express accommodation mandate—requiring pregnancy to be
accommodated to the same extent as other disabilities with a similar effect on
work—is effectively being read out of the statute.223
Judicial hostility to accommodation mandates runs deep and pervades U.S.
discrimination law.224 It underlies the stinginess of the disparate impact claim,
the courts’ minimalist approaches to religious accommodation under Title VII,
and most notably, the courts’ narrow interpretations of what counts as a
disability under the ADA.225 Indeed, it was the Supreme Court’s strict
interpretation of the ADA, including its narrow view of what counts as a
qualified disability, which led Congress to amend the statute in 2008.226 The
recent PDA decisions, refusing to allow employees entitled to accommodations
under the ADA to be used as comparators for pregnant women under the PDA,
reflect the same kind of resistance to accommodation norms that precipitated the
ADAAA in the first place.
A third theme evident in the PDA case law, and shared by discrimination
law generally, is that “discrimination” is equated with a conscious intent to
disadvantage the protected group. As discussed above, recent court decisions
have turned the PDA, including clause two, into a search for animus. The clause
two cases are especially notorious for this. By rejecting comparisons to ADAqualified disabilities in applying clause two, courts have made the reason for
denying accommodations to pregnant workers the key to winning the claim.
Our review of PDA cases decided between January 1, 2009 and June 29, 2012,
found that the cases in which the plaintiff survived summary judgment and/or
motions to dismiss were, overwhelmingly, cases that fit an animus model.227 We
223. See text accompanying notes 135-90 supra.
224. A number of commentators have acknowledged this hostility in the courts, but made
convincing arguments that the traditionally-conceived dichotomy separating accommodation claims
from the rest of discrimination law is a false one. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001) (critiquing the sharp doctrinal distinction between
antidiscrimination and accommodation, and arguing that the costs imposed by each are equivalent);
Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 861 (2004) (discussing similarities between the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
requirements and other discrimination laws); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party
Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357,
1386-1404 (2009) (discussing the third-party harasser claim as an unacknowledged form of a failure to
accommodate claim, and criticizing the artificial distinction between nonaccommodation and other
recognized discrimination claims).
225. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 55 (2009) (discussing views of ADA critics claiming a strong distinction between the
ADA’s accommodation mandate and other discrimination laws); Karen Engle, The Persistence of
Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317,
357-406 (1997) (discussing judicial resistance to Title VII’s requirement that employers reasonably
accommodate religious practices).
226. See Cox, supra note 200, at 461-62 (outlining the amendments to the ADA coverage).
227. See Memorandum from RA (on file with authors). Our research searched for PDA claims
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found 59 cases in which plaintiffs prevailed. Almost all of these involved claims
under clause one, where plaintiffs alleged adverse actions taken on the basis of
pregnancy, despite the plaintiff’s continuing ability to do the job. In more than
half of these winning cases, the plaintiff had what might be called “direct”
evidence of animus, such as an admission that pregnancy was the reason for the
adverse treatment or disparaging comments from a supervisor or manager
referencing the pregnancy.
Much has been written about the conflation of discrimination with animus,
and the PDA is by no means unique in trending toward an “insular
individualism” as the prototype for what amounts to actionable
discrimination.228 The Supreme Court’s recent employment discrimination cases
– Ricci v. DeStefano,229 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,230 and Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes231 – conceive of unlawful discrimination as stemming from a
conscious intent to treat persons worse because of their status as members of a
protected class. In these and other cases, institutional bias in the structure of the
workplace that disadvantages women or persons of color does not register as
discrimination.
Against this backdrop, the appearance of these themes in the PDA case law
might be viewed as predictable, if not inevitable. However, when considered in
light of the text and history of the PDA, the infiltration of these crosscurrents into
the PDA case law is rather stunning. That these tensions have cropped up in the
PDA cases says something about the resilience of the gender ideology behind
pregnancy discrimination.
While common to discrimination law generally, these three themes—
resistance to bootstrapping, hostility to accommodation mandates, and requiring
proof of animus—are rebuked by a plain-meaning reading of the PDA itself.
Clause two of the PDA explicitly ties the treatment of pregnant workers to the
treatment of non-pregnant workers similar in their ability to work. There is no
room in this language for exempting ADA-covered disabilities, or any other
conditions with a similar effect on work, from this comparison. There is no
bootstrapping needed to put pregnant workers on an equal footing with other
workers, receiving accommodations, who have a similar capacity to work; it is
done in one step, through the statute’s text. Judicial hostility to mandating
accommodations must be strong enough to overcome the literal language of
clause two. Likewise, reducing PDA violations to a search for animus is also
incompatible with the language of that clause. Clause two makes the different
treatment of pregnancy, compared to other conditions similarly affecting work, a
violation of the Act. The violation does not hinge on the reason for denying that
treatment to pregnant workers. Unlike the arguably more ambiguous “because
of” pregnancy language in the first clause, which is parallel to the entry point for
using Lexis, Westlaw, and Bloomberg Law databases, decided between January 1, 2009 and June 29,
2012.
228. See Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v.
Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (2008) (discussing the insular individualism in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear and the potential consequences on antidiscrimination law).
229. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
230. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
231. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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an animus approach in the rest of discrimination law, clause two defines
discrimination as the unequal treatment of pregnancy and other conditions
similarly affecting work, regardless of the reason. The fact that lower courts
have nevertheless gravitated toward an animus approach to the PDA is therefore
striking, and reveals the staying power of the ideology embedded in Gilbert.
B. The Gender Ideology in the PDA Case Law
The spreading of these three themes into the PDA case law despite the text
of clause two reflects a deep-seated ambivalence about the regulation of
pregnancy in the workplace.232 U.S. culture is marked by a long and continuing
history of ambivalence about working mothers. Pregnancy marks the beginning
of that ambivalence, and brings with it its own set of projected associations. Iris
Marion Young eloquently captured the way cultural depictions of idealized
pregnancy erase the agency of pregnant women, characterizing the dominant
image of pregnancy as “a time of quiet waiting” in which the woman is
“expecting,” “a time of waiting and watching, when nothing happens.”233 In this
account, the presumptive incompatibility between the woman’s pregnancy—a
passive and objectified state—and her active engagement with work is implicit.
In recent years, ambivalence about working mothers has taken the form of
hyped-up stories that amplify and glorify trends of women leaving the labor
force to devote more time to mothering.234 The gender ideology underlying these
stories is in synch with the gender ideology behind the refusal to accommodate
pregnancy in the workplace. Asking the question of whether pregnancy should
be accommodated implicitly assumes non-pregnant workers as the norm.
Pregnancy is cast as a special liability, an impediment to work, which
foregrounds the reproductive role of the pregnant subject. The question of
whether and how to accommodate pregnancy at work triggers descriptive and
prescriptive stereotypes about how pregnancy and motherhood do and should
affect women’s attachment to the labor force.
The gender ideologies behind pregnancy discrimination, though loaded
with stereotypes, make for a bad fit with the animus model of discrimination.
Cultural ambivalence about working mothers is masked by an overlay of
reverence for pregnancy and motherhood, with an idealized white motherhood
occupying a central place in popular consciousness. Carol Sanger highlighted
the complicated meaning of motherhood when she pointed out that motherhood

232. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, The Price She Pays, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 815 (2012) (discussing
cultural ambivalence toward working mothers).
233. IRIS MARION YOUNG, ON FEMALE BODY EXPERIENCE: ‘THROWING LIKE A GIRL’ AND OTHER
ESSAYS 54 (2005).
234. For a summary of recent pieces in the popular press on this theme, see A. Joan Saab, Creating
a Life or Opting Out: Antifeminism and the Popular Media, 8 J. ASSOC. FOR RES. ON MOTHERHOOD 233
(2006). For a counterpoint to the so-called “opt-out” trend, see LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK: A
MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN OF THE WORLD (2006). Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote a controversial essay in
which she proclaimed it virtually impossible for women to really “have it all.” See Anne-Marie
Slaughter,
Why
Women
Still
Can’t
Have
it
All,
ATLANTIC,
July/Aug.
2012,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-itall/309020/.
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is simultaneously “both revered and regulated.”235 It is also pegged as “normal”
for women—both descriptively, in that the vast majority of women do become
mothers, and prescriptively, in the stigma and questioning that surrounds
women who remain childless throughout their lives.236 As Katherine Franke
observes, maternity is so normalized for women that women who do not become
mothers are seen as cultural anomalies, and even “unnatural” women.237 In this
complicated stew, it is not obvious what animus toward pregnancy looks like.
Ambivalence about working mothers is clothed with reverence toward
pregnancy, at least for women whose reproduction is highly valued. For these
women, there is no animus towards pregnancy per se, but a glorification of
pregnancy, along with an anticipated elevation of the maternal role over other
(and presumably competing) roles.
Indeed, much cultural discourse glorifies motherhood, depicting it as an
empowered state showcasing women’s fierceness and determination to protect
and nurture their young. The “mama grizzly” is a newly resurgent iconic ideal,
in which women are lionesses protecting, developing, and hovering over their
young.238 In this narrative, women are the superior parents, sharply contrasting
with the ineptitude of men in domestic realms. The mama grizzly role is
portrayed as one chosen by women, and so outside the structures of the separatespheres ideology of old.239 The constraints that shape this “choice,” however, are
left unexplored.
Gender ideologies lionizing mothers in the maternal sphere may complicate
the search for animus against pregnant workers, but they do not actually
enhance the appeal of women as workers or protect them from discrimination.
Quite the contrary. Implicit in this duality of parenting (the ultra-competent
mama grizzly versus the caring but bumbling dad) is that the woman’s maternal
zeal is reserved for the children, with little leftover for other endeavors.
Women’s fierceness and determination in this ideal is located firmly within
separate spheres ideology; it does not give women added competence in the
workplace or make them more valuable as employees.240
Social science research suggests that ambivalent reactions to combining
work and motherhood translate into pregnancy-based bias in the workplace.
Although there is not as much empirical research on pregnancy discrimination as
one might expect, the research that has been done finds pregnancy to be a likely

235. Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 15, 17 (1992).
236. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 66, at 372 n.28 (citing census data showing that only 18% of
women will not have given birth by their 44th birthday).
237. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 181, 185 (2001) (“Reproduction has been so taken for granted that only women who are not
parents are regarded as having made a choice—a choice that is constructed as nontraditional,
nonconventional, and for some, non-natural.”).
238. See Naomi Mezey & Cornelia T. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
229, 250-53 (2010) (describing mothers as protectors).
239. See id.
240. See, e.g., Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC.
1297, 1306 (2007) (discussing research showing conflict between intensive mothering norms and
perceptions of competence at work).
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trigger for bias.241 One study contrasted the reactions of retail store employees to
pregnant customers with their reactions to pregnant job applicants.242 Store
workers were more likely to respond benevolently to pregnant customers (with
overly-friendly responses, affirming touches and affectionate but diminutive
references like “honey” and “sweetie”), but hostilely to pregnant applicants.243 A
follow-up study found that reactions to pregnant applicants were especially
hostile when women applied for masculine-typed jobs.244 Other studies have
found that pregnant women are rated as less competent and less suited for
promotion than non-pregnant workers performing the same work, are less likely
to be recommended for hire, and receive lower salary recommendations.245 One
researcher has coined the term “pregnant presenteeism” for the phenomenon of
pregnant workers seeking to compensate for employer bias by presenting
themselves as healthy and remaining at work even when they are unwell.246 This
literature finds that, rather than presenting in the form of animus or dislike,
reactions to pregnant women are ambivalent, situational and role-dependent.
While not specific to pregnancy per se, an even more robust body of research
documents a motherhood penalty in the workplace, which suggests that
impending maternity is also likely to trigger stereotyping and bias. In one study,
for example, subjects received a pair of resumes featuring equally qualified
applicants of the same gender and race, differing only by parental status.247
Subjects in the study judged the mothers in the pairs as “significantly less
competent and committed than women without children.”248 Not only did the
subjects’ views of women’s competence vary by maternal status, they also
recommended lower starting salaries for the women, but not men, who were

241. For two early, foundational studies documenting pregnancy-bias in the workplace, see Jane
A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a source of bias in performance appraisals, 14 J. ORG. BEHAV. 649 (1993)
(finding substantial negative stereotyping against pregnant workers, resulting in significantly more
negative performance appraisals of pregnant workers, especially by male reviewers) and Sara J.
Corse, Pregnant Managers and their Subordinates: The Effects of Gender Expectations on Hierarchical
Relationships, 26 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 25 (1990) (finding pregnant managers were penalized when
they acted firmly, in a conflict situation, instead of conforming to expectations that pregnant women
are more empathetic and nurturing).
242. Michelle R. Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women:
Complementary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards that Maintain Traditional Roles, 92 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 1499 (2007).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1508-09.
245. See Jennifer Cunningham & Therese Macan, Effects of Applicant Pregnancy on Hiring Decisions
and Interview Ratings, 57 SEX ROLES 497 (2007); Bragger et al., The Effects of the Structured Interview on
Reducing Biases Against Pregnant Job Applicants, 46 SEX ROLES 215 (2002); Caroline Gatrell, Managing the
Maternal Body: A Comprehensive Review and Transdisciplinary Analysis, 13 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 97, 98100 (2011); Barbara Masser et al., ‘We Like You, But We Don’t Want You’—The Impact of Pregnancy in the
Workplace, 57 SEX ROLES 703 (2007) (discussing similar findings in an Australia-based study); Liisa
Mäkelä, A Narrative Approach to Pregnancy-related Discrimination and Leader-follower Relationships, 19
GENDER, WORK & ORG. 677 (2011) (discussing similar findings in a Finnish study).
246. Caroline Jane Gatrell, ‘I’m a bad mum’: Pregnant presenteeism and poor health at work, 72 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 478 (2011).
247. Correll, supra note 240, at 1308 (the pairs were of either white women or African American
women, to account for the possible influence of race on a motherhood bias).
248. Id. at 1316.
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parents.249 The subjects held mothers to higher performance standards and
punctuality requirements and actually gave them less leeway for being late to
work than they gave fathers and non-parents.250 A follow-up, companion study
of actual employers, in which equally qualified mothers and non-mothers
applied for jobs, found that childless women received twice as many callbacks as
mothers, despite having equally strong resumes.251 Another study found that
professional working women who became mothers were perceived as more
warm, but less competent, than women without children and men with
children.252 Professional working fathers, in contrast, were perceived as warmer
and more competent after becoming parents.253 Subjects in this study had less
interest in hiring, promoting or training mothers compared to fathers and
childless workers.254 Other research confirms these findings, showing mothers
evaluated more harshly and treated less leniently than fathers.255 These findings
are consistent with research documenting a per-child wage penalty of about five
percent for employed mothers in the U.S.256
So far, we have been discussing biases surrounding pregnancy and
maternity as if they were monolithic and applied the same to all women. But
gender ideologies surrounding work and motherhood have always been
implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) racialized.257 Young’s depiction of
pregnancy as a passive, waiting state, for example, represents an implicitly white
ideal of pregnancy. Women of color historically have been both less revered
while pregnant and presumed to be less in need of protection from the rigors of
work. Tales lionizing mothers and celebrating their supposed “opt-out” rights
map onto an unarticulated but racially and economically specific ideal mother.
As A. Joan Saab explains in describing the assumptions underlying Danielle
Crittenden’s discourse blaming “feminism” for misleading women into thinking
they can have both motherhood and a career, Crittenden’s “average woman is
white, middle class, and for the most part a fiction.”258 As Saab explains, the
“feminism” in the opt-out literature is oblivious to “the important issues of race,
class, gender, and sexual identity that feminist theorists and activists have spent
the past ‘30-odd years’ addressing.”259
The narratives about motherhood and work, including those about

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1327-30.
252. Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J.
SOC. ISSUES 701, 701 (2004).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 711-12.
255. Kathleen Fuegen, et al. Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and Parental Status
Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 737, 748-49 (2004); Cecilia L. Ridgeway
& Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 683 (2004).
256. Correll, supra note 240, at 1297.
257. See generally Adrien Katherine Wing & Laura Weselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of
Mothering: The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 257 (1999) (discussing
race and the ideal mother).
258. Saab, supra note 234, at 236.
259. Id. at 238.
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pregnancy and work, do not apply alike to all mothers. For mothers whose
reproduction is tagged as socially valuable, pregnancy marks a revered state that
precedes a socially prized role for women. Women of color, unmarried women,
and economically vulnerable women have often triggered different reactions
when they become pregnant.260 They are more likely to be viewed as
irresponsible reproducers, and are expected to work, while at the same time are
predicted to be less reliable workers. In the study discussed above, in which
reviewers evaluated same-race, same-gender pairs, African American mothers
were rated as less likely to be promoted than their equally qualified white
maternal counterparts.261 Consistent with this ideology, researchers investigating
how gender stereotypes affect working mothers have found that white mothers
are viewed more positively if they stay home with their children, while African
American mothers are viewed more positively if they work.262 At the same time,
however, African American women are more likely to be stereotyped as
unreliable workers after becoming mothers.263
Women of color, single women, and economically vulnerable women who
must navigate the cultural fault-lines for working mothers are susceptible to
charges of being bad mothers, irresponsible for having children at all, or for
having too many children.264 At the same time, they are expected to continue
working without “special” accommodation, a sentiment reflected in the harsh
judgments reserved for “welfare mothers” who are dependent on state
support.265 These mothers are burdened not by a stereotypically protective
chivalry ushering them out of the workplace as much as an insistence that they
work unimpaired and unaffected by pregnancy and motherhood. And yet, here
too, the gender ideology behind the refusal to accommodate pregnancy in the
workplace does not easily map onto a conscious animus seeking to keep women
out of the workplace upon becoming pregnant. The gender ideology here insists
that they stay in the workforce, even as it suspects that they may not be able to
meet employer expectations.
While there is no single, universal gender ideology targeting pregnancy and
maternity at work, the animus model is a poor fit for everyone—for women who
approximate the maternal ideal as well as the many who do not. For the
pregnant woman who fits the idealized portrayal of passive waiting in Iris
Marion Young’s account, there is not animus towards pregnancy as much as a
prioritization of her maternal role. But the flip-side of this is the diminished
260. Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 379-81(1996).
261. Correll et al., supra note 240, at 1324. The researchers noted that the other motherhood
penalties studied—recommendations to hire and salary recommendations—were not significantly
affected by maternal race, and emphasized that both groups of women studied, white and African
American, experienced the motherhood penalty. Id.
262. See Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the Ladder, 19 GEO. J.
POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 1, 39-40 (2012) (discussing studies) [hereinafter Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder].
263. Id.
264. For an insightful discussion of African American women’s history of having their
relationships with their children devalued and severed, see generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 216 (1991) (presenting stories of African
American women’s vulnerability to having their children taken away from them); see also McClain,
Irresponsible Reproduction, supra note 260 (critiquing the rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction).
265. CHAMALLAS, supra note 66, at 378-79.
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value placed on her paid work. For women who do not fit Young’s ideal, who
are expected to work without complaint throughout their pregnancies, there is
not (usually) animus against their staying in the workplace. Rather, they are
expected to stay without “special” treatment, but likely to confront assumptions
that having children will interfere with their work ethic and performance.
Neither combination (valuing motherhood while devaluing work, or devaluing
motherhood while valuing work) presents itself neatly as the kind of pregnancybased antipathy that the courts are searching for in applying the PDA. As a
result, ideologies about gender, race and maternity continue to deprive pregnant
women of the accommodations many will need to perform their jobs throughout
pregnancy.
The gender ideology behind pregnancy discrimination, including the denial
of accommodations for pregnant workers, is largely an ideology about women,
but there is a gender ideology about men here too. As masculinities scholars
remind us, no examination of gender injustice is complete without asking “the
man question”: what masculinity is behind this?266 The flip-side of resistance to
accommodating pregnant women at work is an assumption that pregnant
women are (or should be) partnered with a male breadwinner. While mothers
bear a wage-penalty, fathers as a group benefit from a wage bonus—reflecting a
conception (again, implicitly raced) of fatherhood as entitling (privileged) men to
a family-wage.267 This idealized, race/class-specific masculinity is implicit,
though unarticulated, in the devaluation of pregnant workers compared to other
workers with similar restrictions on work ability.
Indeed, the very terminology surrounding work and motherhood
presupposes a male breadwinner in the background. Martha Chamallas has
unpacked the cultural meaning of the word “mother” in explaining that the
unmodified “mother” evokes a married woman who is partnered with a male
earner and whose primary identity is her maternal role.268 She explains how the
modifiers tell a revealing story: “unmarried mothers” and “single mothers” are
common objects of conversation, usually with the suggestion of a social problem
in the making.269 One very rarely hears the term “married mother”— because
left unmodified, the mother’s marital status is presumed.270 Likewise, there is no
male counterpart to the “working mother”; the “working father” is not often
found in the work-family lexicon.271 It is assumed that men combine work and
parenthood; a “father” is presumed to engage in paid work and needs no
modifier to signal his status as a worker.272 The masculinity that supports the

266. See generally NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE
(2010) (exploring masculinities scholarship and how it can better feminist legal theory). For a
discussion of the need to engage men and masculinity to rebalance caretaking responsibilities, see
generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER
(2010).
267. Correll et al., supra note 240, at 1307-08.
268. CHAMALLAS, supra note 66, at 367.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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unmodified mother is the privileged masculinity of the male breadwinner.273
Likewise, the masculinity that supports the narrow scope of the PDA is the
ideal male wage-earner who can support a family on his salary and pick up the
slack if his pregnant wife has to stop working. This traditional masculinity has
historically been restricted to white men from the middle- to upper- classes.274 In
this ideal, the man’s reproductive and parenting roles not only present no
conflict with work, his work is secure enough for him to become the sole
provider, at least for a while.275 His labor force attachment is not expected to
wane with parenthood—unlike the mother’s, which is expected to do so (a
presumption likely to become self-fulfilling if she loses her job while
pregnant).276
But as is often the case, this idealized masculinity is just that—it does not fit
most peoples’ reality.277 There are fewer than ever two-parent households that
can support a family with only one working parent. Lower-income families are
especially far from this ideal. Among households in the bottom third of family
incomes, over 25% of married fathers are unemployed or work only part-time.278
Even a full-time employee working forty hours a week all year long, with no
time off, earning minimum wage will have an annual income of only $15,080.279
At this rate, even families with two full-time workers earning minimum wage
will struggle to make ends meet. For many families, whether a woman is able to
work through pregnancy can make the difference between continuing to survive
economically and falling off the deep end. And of course, many families do not
have two parents in the household. A large proportion of low-income families
are headed by single mothers.280 The ideal masculinity that is constructed by
employer refusals to accommodate pregnancy in the workplace is based on a
fictional account of prescriptive gender roles, not the reality of most workers’
lives.
The increasingly hostile PDA case law reflects not so much a problem with
273. Id. at 367-68.
274. See Joan C. Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of
Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 89, 122-23 (1998) (noting the difficulties of men of
color, especially African American men, to meet the standard of masculinity defined by the income);
see also Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Wisc. J. L. Gender & Soc’y 201 23940 (2008) (on the elusiveness of breadwinner masculinity for black men).
275. This ideal has become an increasingly poor fit with most men’s lives. See Ann C. McGinley,
Crowdsourcing the Work-Family Debate: A Colloquy: I; Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 Seattle
Univ. L. Rev. 703, 709, 714 (2011).
276. Cf. Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of Men, 63
HASTINGS L. J. 1297 (2012) (discussing gender stereotypes about ideal fatherhood and masculinity that
penalize men who seek to modify their work lives to accommodate caretaking obligations as fathers).
277. For example, Joan Williams has pointed out that men in blue collar jobs actually do much
more child care and housework than men in professional, white collar jobs, even though they are
often reticent about it. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE, supra note 266, at 59.
278. Joan C. Williams & Heather Boushey, The Three Faces of Work-Family Conflict: The Poor, the
Professionals,
and
the
Missing
Middle
(Jan.
2010),
at
13,
available
at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/01/pdf/threefaces.pdf.
279. Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262, at 6 (citing economic data).
280. Id. at 16. See also TIMOTHY S. GRALL, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support:
2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Nov. 2009, at 2, available at www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-237.pdf
(stating that four-fifths of all single parents living with children are women).
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the statute itself as the resilience of gender ideologies surrounding maternity,
work, and (implicitly) masculinity. A court’s answer to the question of whether
discrimination occurred depends in part on its baseline expectations about what
a nondiscriminatory world would look like.281 Presumptions and prescriptions
about women’s attachment to the workforce, the comparative value of women’s
maternal roles and work roles, and women’s attachment to male breadwinners
infuse judicial understandings of what pregnancy discrimination looks like, and
accordingly, when and why courts recognize it.
IV. WHICH WOMEN LOSE THE MOST? LOOKING AT THE PDA THROUGH THE LENS OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM
The PDA’s failure to accommodate pregnant women and new mothers
leaves many working women with stark and unappealing choices: live up to
unrealistic work expectations for as long as possible, often with significant risk to
maternal or fetal health, or be forced out of a job.282 Despite the popularity of
stories foregrounding the work-life “balance” struggles of mostly privileged,
professional women, the women most vulnerable to work-pregnancy conflicts
are the least privileged workers. This has always been a downfall of the PDA,
with its failure to mandate paid leave or affirmatively guarantee any substantive
protections for pregnant women.283 While the scope of the PDA was limited
from the outset, the law’s failings have come into sharper relief as courts have
found new ways to undermine analogies to workers with other kinds of
conditions that employers are accommodating.
The PDA has always held the most promise for women working for
generous employers, those that have flexible leave and benefits. These women
have the most to gain from the PDA’s prohibition on treating pregnant women
worse than other workers with conditions similarly affecting work. Lower-wage
workers are more likely to work for stingier employers, who do little to nothing
281. Cf. Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86
GEO. L. J. 279 (1997) (arguing that it is not the intent standard itself as much as judges’ worldviews
about the ongoing existence of discrimination that drives the results in discrimination cases); Katie R.
Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV.
1275 (2012) (discussing social psychology research finding that beliefs about meritocracy and the
prevalence or rarity of discrimination greatly influence peoples’ perceptions of discrimination).
282. See, e.g., Gatrell, supra note 245 (challenging the belief that pregnant employees are prone to
take sick leave).
283. Low-wage workers are much less likely than higher-paid workers to work for employers that
offer maternity leave, sick leave, vacation leave, or any kind of personal leave that would give
employees paid time off for pregnancy and childbirth. See Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note
262, at 10 (noting that, of workers in the bottom wage quartile, only 23% have any paid sick days, and
that “[a]lmost 70% of all lower-income workers have two weeks or less of sick and vacation days
combined”); see also Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6-8 (2007) (citing disparities between professional employees and lower-wage
workers in access to leave); see also NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, WORKING WOMEN NEED
PAID SICK DAYS 1, 1 (Oct. 2012) (“[e]ighty-two percent of workers making $8.25 per hour or less don’t
have access to paid sick days.”). Cf. Patricia A. Shiu & Stephanie M. Wildman, Pregnancy
Discrimination and Social Change: Evolving Consciousness About a Worker’s Right to Job-Protected, Paid
Leave, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 126-27, n. 33 (2009) (discussing California’s bolder approach to
protecting pregnant workers, in which proponents of mandating leave made their case by focusing
on the needs of the most economically vulnerable women).
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for any worker, thus giving pregnant workers the right to only the same poor
treatment under the PDA.284 However, as employers have extended more
generous treatment to certain classes of workers—as required by law for disabled
workers under the ADA, or through collective bargaining agreements or
voluntarily for workers with on-the-job injuries—pregnant workers should
benefit under a proper reading of the PDA. The trends discussed above in the
PDA case law are particularly harmful to lower-wage and economically
vulnerable women. These are the women whose pregnancies are most likely to
come into conflict with their work environments.285 They are also the women
who need the law the most, and who are now faring the worst under the PDA
case law. And they can least afford the lost pay that results when such conflicts
force them out of a job.
A recent case from the Seventh Circuit, Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,286 illustrates just how badly the PDA is failing economically vulnerable
workers. Svetlana Arizanovska worked three days a week for Wal-Mart as a
stocker on the overnight shift.287 Her duties included “finding items for her
assigned areas and placing the items on the shelves.”288 Because stocking may
involve lifting heavy items, Wal-Mart requires its stockers to be able to lift 50
pounds.289 Arizanovska’s first pregnancy while working at Wal-Mart ended in
miscarriage.290 When she became pregnant a second time, her doctor restricted
her from lifting more than ten pounds.291 Arizanovska informed Wal-Mart of the
restriction and asked to be assigned job duties that would accommodate this
restriction, such as folding clothes.292 Wal-Mart replied that no such position
existed, since persons folding clothes also had stocking duties, and placed her on
284. See National Women’s Law Center, It Shouldn’t Be a Heavy Lift: Fair Treatment for Pregnant
Workers (2013), at 6-7, at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant_workers.pdf
(noting the inflexibility of employers in low-wage jobs).
285. Id. at 1, 3, 5.-7 Cf. Amy Armenia & Naomi Gerstel, Family leaves, the FMLA and Gender
neutrality: The Intersection of Race and Gender, 35 SOC. SCI. RES. 871, 874 (2005) (discussing research
finding that “relatively privileged workers—especially those working in large organizations, with
salaried rather than waged jobs, or union members—are in a better position to negotiate” with their
employers to get their needs met).
286. Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 682 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2012). Since the court’s decision
was a ruling on the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the description of the facts in this
article is based on the plaintiff’s version of facts.
287. In addition to working the overnight shift at Wal-Mart on Friday, Saturday and Sunday
nights, the plaintiff also worked for another company from 10:30 am – 7:00 pm, Mondays through
Fridays, packing and shipping medicines. Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107405, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2011). The plaintiff’s relentless work schedule itself speaks
volumes about lower-wage workers’ need to work through pregnancy as a matter of economic
security.
288. Id. at *2.
289. Id. at *4.
290. The plaintiff experienced conflicts at work during her first pregnancy too. While under
medical supervision for spotting and bleeding, Arizanovska informed her supervisor at Wal-Mart
that her doctor had told her not to lift more than 20 pounds. While her supervisor initially
accommodated this restriction by assigning her to the baby food and toothbrush aisles, the plaintiff
alleged that her supervisor soon assigned her back to an aisle that required heavier lifting.
Arizanoska miscarried shortly thereafter. Id. at *4-5.
291. Id. at *5.
292. Id.
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an involuntary leave of absence.293 Once again, Arizanovska’s pregnancy ended
in miscarriage.294 This time, she sued Wal-Mart under the PDA.295
Importantly, the court emphasized that Wal-Mart’s response was consistent
with its policy on employee accommodations—a policy that on its face treats
pregnancy on a different footing than disabilities that must be accommodated
under the ADA.296 The court’s opinion includes the following excerpt from WalMart’s Accommodation in Employment Policy:
If you have a medical condition that is not a disability, but which prevents you
from performing your job, including pregnancy, you may be eligible for a job aid
or environmental adjustment under this policy, a leave of absence under the
Leave of Absence Policy, or you also may request transfer to another open
position under the Associate Transfer Policy. . . .297

The policy goes on to tightly restrict the circumstances under which a
worker covered under the policy is eligible for an accommodation:
Job aid or environmental adjustment means a change in practices or the work
environment which is both easily achievable and which will have no negative
impact on the business. This type of accommodation does not include creating a
job, light duty or temporary alternative duty, or reassignment.298

In contrast, accommodations required by the ADA may, in some cases,
include light duty, temporary alternative duties and/or reassignment.299
Yet despite the divergence between accommodations for pregnancy and
ADA-qualified disabilities under the policy, the court found Wal-Mart’s policy
unproblematic under the PDA.300 The court began by faulting the plaintiff for
failing to identity a non-pregnant, similarly situated employee who was treated
more favorably.301 While this requirement is not necessarily objectionable, much
depends on the determination of who counts as similarly situated. The court’s
implicit acceptance of Wal-Mart’s policy suggests that only “non-disabled”
workers seeking accommodation are similarly situated to pregnant workers for
purposes of the PDA. The court described the sought-after comparators as
293. Id. at *5-6.
294. Id. at *7.
295. 682 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2012).
296. Id. at 702-03.
297. Arizanovska, 682 F.3d at 701.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
the ADA requires reasonable accommodation of an employee with a disability to a vacant position to
which he seeks to transfer).
300. In theory, the court left room for challenging the policy in some other case, pointing out that
the plaintiff’s claim proceeded “only under the indirect proof method,” as opposed to using the
“direct” method. Arizanovska, 682 F.3d at 702. Accordingly, the court apparently viewed the plaintiff
as having foregone a direct challenge to the policy itself as facially discriminatory on the basis of
pregnancy. Id. at 703 (dismissing plaintiff’s argument as “really a challenge to the policy itself,” and
“not applicable when proving a discrimination case under the indirect method”). However, for the
reasons discussed below, the court’s reasoning nevertheless implicitly rejects such a challenge.
Moreover, the court’s sharp divide between “direct” and “indirect” methods of proof serves only to
limit the scope of clause two, which makes no such distinction.
301. Id. at 702.
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having “temporary medical restrictions that prevented them from doing their job
duties.”302 As discussed above, the reflexive and unwarranted limitation of
comparators to those with only temporary disabilities led the court to implicitly
exclude comparators with more lasting disabilities. In expressly differentiating
pregnant workers from disabled workers in the policy, the company may have
been operating under (again, unwarranted) implicit associations of pregnancy
with only temporary conditions and ADA-disabilities with more permanent
ones. As discussed above, this kind of parsing defies both the 2008 Amendments
(which reject durational limits on disabilities) and the text of the PDA (which
speaks only of similarity in work capacity, not duration of disability).
Having so narrowed the class of proper comparators, and without proof of
a more favorably-treated “similarly situated” comparator, the court regarded
Wal-Mart’s refusal to accommodate Arizanovska as an even-handed, nonanimus based application of the store’s accommodation policy, which it
described as “consistent with Title VII’s requirements.”303 On that point, the
court cited Serednyj, one of the PDA decisions previously discussed. The
Arizanovska decision thus further entrenches the obliteration of clause two in the
recent PDA case law.
So construed, the PDA allows employers to deny workers such as
Ariznovska—those in highly structured workplaces with broadly applicable and
inflexible rules—even modest accommodations as long as the employer’s reason
for doing so does not appear as pregnancy-based animus. As a class, the
workers most affected by this are the most economically vulnerable.
Workers in physically demanding jobs, including police work, firefighting,
construction jobs and factory work (especially if it involves exposure to
chemicals or other safety hazards), will likely face conflicts with work at some
point during pregnancy. Many employers for such jobs do not voluntarily do
much to accommodate pregnancy. Police departments, for example, have been
criticized for routinely denying requests for maternity uniforms and off-street or
otherwise modified duties, and for lacking maternity leave policies.304 Many
jobs, such as Ariznovska’s stocking job, have lifting requirements that create
conflicts with pregnancy. Workers in these jobs may require alternative, lightduty assignments to be able to work through pregnancy.
Other jobs may not be physically demanding, but take place in highly
regulated, inflexible work environments. For example, Stephanie Bornstein,
discussing the conflicts facing mothers at the lower end of the wage scale, notes
that one-third of lower-wage workers cannot choose their break times.305
Pregnant workers needing breaks to go to the restroom or drink water would
need minor accommodations in such work environments in order to do so. In

302. Id. (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 703.
304. See Corina Schulze, Institutionalized Masculinity in U.S. Police Departments: How Maternity
Leave Policies (or Lack Thereof) Affect Women in Policing, 23(2) CRIM. J. STUD. 177 (2010).
305. Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262, at 9; see also Liz Watson & Jennifer Swanberg,
Flexible Workplace Solutions for Low-Wage Hourly Workers: A Framework for a National Conversation,
WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY, May 2011, at 19 (“between 40% and 50% of low-wage hourly workers
report. . .being unable to determine when to take breaks while at work.”).
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one lawsuit against Wal-Mart seeking such an accommodation, a woman who
monitored fitting rooms alleged that she was fired for insubordination for
carrying a water bottle in accordance with her doctor’s orders to drink water
throughout the day.306 As it is now being interpreted, the PDA fails to provide
pregnant workers with even such minor accommodations as permission to drink
water on a shift and extra restroom breaks. These kinds of conflicts between
pregnancy and work are especially pronounced in lower-wage jobs.307
Pregnant workers in low-wage jobs are especially vulnerable to refusals for
accommodations, even as some of their co-workers (such as those with on-thejob injuries or ADA-qualified disabilities) are extended accommodations. In
denying accommodations for pregnancy (while extending them to others),
employers treat pregnant workers as fungible and not worth even the (often)
minimal costs it would take to keep them. This itself reflects an ideology that
devalues pregnant workers and new mothers in lower-wage jobs. In Bornstein’s
survey of cases compiled in a database by the Center for WorkLife Law at the
U.C-Hastings College of Law, she found that “the cases reveal an extreme
hostility to pregnancy in low-wage workplaces, including workers fired on the
spot or immediately after announcing a pregnancy, pregnant employees banned
from certain positions no matter what their individual capabilities to do the job,
and workers refused even small, cost-effective adjustments that would allow
them to continue to work throughout their pregnancies,” and even some
instances where pregnant workers were told by their supervisors to get
abortions.308 Bornstein also found a harsher pattern of treatment for pregnant
women of color, who were denied accommodations routinely granted to other
pregnant workers.309
Courts’ restricted interpretation of what counts as a condition “related” to
pregnancy, and what it means to “discriminate” against such conditions under
clause one, also harms economically vulnerable workers. Breastfeeding, for
example, is more likely to conflict with work in more rigidly structured
workplaces. Lack of time to express milk, lack of a private place to do so, lack of
storage facilities, and lack of support from supervisors and/or coworkers are
common obstacles to continuing to breastfeed while working. Research on the
economic effects of breastfeeding has found that mothers who breastfeed for six
months or longer suffer more severe and more prolonged earnings losses than

306. Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 2168911, at *2 (D. Kan. July 21,
2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s FMLA claim, where plaintiff alleged that under store policy, only
cashiers could have access to a water bottle while they worked, and that she was fired for violating
the policy).
307. Cf. Paula McDonald et al., Expecting the worst: circumstances surrounding pregnancy
discrimination at work and progress to formal redress, 39 INDUS. REL. J. 229, 237 (2008) [hereinafter
McDonald, Expecting The Worst] (discussing results of a study of 318 cases of pregnancy
discrimination in Australia, finding that most cases occurred in occupations lower on the
occupational ladder, such as sales/personal service work and lower-skilled administrative workers,
and that “far fewer women who reported pregnancy-related problems in their workplaces worked in
relatively more privileged jobs such as managers/administrators. . . or professionals. . .”).
308. Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262, at 5. See also Gatrell, supra note 245, at 104-05
(reviewing literature on pregnancy discrimination and class indicating that working class mothers
are as likely to experience unfair treatment while pregnant as managers).
309. Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262, at 5.
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mothers who formula feed.310 Lower-income workers are less able to bear these
costs. There is also a racial dimension to how the law allocates the costs of
breastfeeding. Researchers have long known that white women are more likely
than Black women to breastfeed.311 Although little is known about why, it may
well be that Black women are less able to bear the economic costs of
breastfeeding and more likely to work in jobs that are less amenable to
accommodating it. What limited research there is on work and breastfeeding
suggests that women in lower-paid jobs, who are disproportionately women of
color, have less access to the kinds of privacy and flexibility that it takes to
sustain breastfeeding while working.312 Lower-earning women also face
disproportionately greater burdens when dealing with other aspects of
reproduction, such infertility and the treatment of it, as well.313
For many workers, pregnancy discrimination is the first block in the
maternal wall. It is difficult for women’s careers to recover from not working
through pregnancy. Gaps in the labor force during pregnancy lead to longer
absences from the workforce, which may become self-reinforcing.314 When
women are forced out of a job due to conflicts with pregnancy and related
conditions, along with reduced labor force attachment comes increased parenting
and domestic responsibilities – and a growing competence gap in domestic
responsibilities between women who have given birth and their partners, a gap
that also becomes self-reinforcing.315 Especially for the most economically
vulnerable workers, conflicts between maternity and work are not just a qualityof-life issue of “balance,” but a core issue of economic security.316
V. WITHER THE PDA(?): DISABILITY AND SEX EQUALITY
Recently, voices from within the legal academy have charted a path to
address pregnancy discrimination under the ADA, particularly in light of the
more expansive definition of disability codified in the 2008 Amendments. Law
professor Jeannette Cox has argued that the social model of disability, which
focuses on the relationship between the body and the work environment (as
opposed to a more narrow medical view that locates disability in bodily
abnormality), encompasses pregnancy.317 She criticizes what she sees as the

310. Phyllis L.F. Rippeyoung & Mary C. Noonan, Is Breastfeeding Truly Cost Free? Income
Consequences of Breastfeeding for Women, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 244, 244 (2012).
311. Id. at 246, 254; Gattrell, supra note 245, at 106.
312. Gattrell, supra note 245, at 106 (reviewing literature on the race and class dimensions of
accommodating breastfeeding at work).
313. See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Infertility, Social Justice, and Equal Citizenship, in GENDER
EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 327, 333-43 (2009).
314. MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL
IDEAL 41 (2007) (noting that even brief absences from the work force have longer-term negative
effects on women’s economic prospects).
315. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 57, 75 (2012) (describing how the market reinforces men’s diminished caretaking role).
316. See Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262 (outlining the struggle between the
necessity of employment and the need to support a household).
317. Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53
B.C. L. REV. 443 (2012).

Brake-Growssman Proof 2 (Do Not Delete)

2/18/2014 11:24 AM

UNPROTECTED SEX

115

feminist movement’s distancing of pregnancy from disability and urges feminist
legal scholars to embrace the social model of disability and its applicability to
pregnancy.318 Sounding a similar theme, law professor Sheerine Alemzadeh also
makes a case for applying the ADA to pregnancy.319 She too questions the
feminist legal community’s historic reticence about the ADA’s exclusion of
pregnancy and criticizes the current distinction the ADA attempts to draw
between “normal” and “abnormal” pregnancy.320 Like Professor Cox, her focus
is on how pregnancy interacts with the work environment, regardless of the
appropriate medical terms.
These promising arguments for using the ADA to seek accommodations for
pregnant workers raise questions about the ongoing need for the PDA and
whether it may have outlived its usefulness, at least in those cases where
accommodations are sought. This question has echoes of earlier debates about
whether a gender-specific or a more universal approach is the best model for
addressing pregnancy and the conflicts pregnant women face in the current
social structure. In the 1980s and into the 90s, this controversy consumed reams
of paper in the legal journals and split the feminist legal community.321 The
premise of the controversy, at least in the beginning, was that a choice between
the two strategies was necessary.322 At this point in history, however, that
premise should not be taken for granted. Of course, the particular question
about whether to require “special treatment” (a pejorative and contested label)
for pregnancy through the PDA was settled in favor of the law’s equal treatment
approach, even though the Supreme Court interpreted the law in Guerra to
permit (but not require) state laws mandating pregnancy-specific protections.323
The question feminists might ask now is the distinctly different one of whether
the PDA, an explicitly feminist legal strategy that uses a sex discrimination
framework, or the ADA, a gender-neutral disability model, is the way to go to
seek legal redress for pregnant workers. But that question too presents a false
choice. Instead of an either/or choice, the question that should be asked in light
of the new disability/pregnancy scholarship is a more modest one: is there
anything to be gained by continuing to fight these battles under the PDA, or
should all energies from this point forward be channeled into theorizing and
interpreting the ADA? In our view, we should not give up on the PDA, even as
we applaud those scholars pressing forward with new arguments for covering
pregnancy under the ADA.

318. Id. at 448-50 (arguing that feminists’ objections to treating pregnancy as a disability because
“it represents heightened rather than diminished biological functioning” is “startlingly similar to the
Gilbert Court’s rationale for distinguishing pregnancy and disability”).
319. Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis of the
ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1 (2012) (examining why pregnancy has
been excluded from coverage as a disability under the ADA).
320. Id. at 9-12.
321. For background on the split in the feminist movement, and argument on how to resolve it,
see generally Krieger & Cooney, supra note 68.
322. See Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 67, at 170 (“If we can’t have it both ways, we need
to think carefully about which way we want to have it.”) Over time, the “if” in that sentence has been
treated as “because.”
323. See California Federal Savings v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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The new scholarship on pregnancy as disability is persuasive in showing
how the social model of disability responds to feminist concerns that analogizing
pregnancy to disability fails to recognize the distinctly positive and healthy
aspects of pregnancy. The social model of disability refuses to see the body as
either inherently able or disabled, and instead focuses on how the body interacts
with the work environment, as currently structured, and the effect on job
capacity. This reframing of disability away from a medical, pathological
approach is in synch with feminist desires to recognize pregnancy as something
that is often (although not always) experienced as a positive in women’s lives,
and as a distinctive ability of women’s bodies, even as pregnancy (sometimes, but
not always) affects a woman’s work capacity.
However, situating pregnancy only under the social model of disability,
without attention to sex equality, would miss something fundamental to
pregnancy and its relationship to work that is distinctively gendered. First, even
insofar as pregnancy discrimination is a reaction to the pregnant body, such
negative reactions are specific to the gendered female body. The pregnant body
can trigger a range of reactions, both positive and negative. The negative ones
include fear and disgust at women’s reproductive processes that are viewed as
messy, leaky, intrusive, repulsive, unpredictable and out of control.324 Negative
reactions to the pregnant body are not necessarily analogous to negative
reactions to other disabling conditions that can affect both men and women.325
The negative reaction to pregnant bodies in the workplace is a reaction to the
distinctively female reproductive process and the accompanying changes that are
specific to women’s bodies.326
More importantly, pregnancy discrimination is not just, or even primarily, a
reaction to the pregnant body or the body’s interaction with the work
environment: there is an ideology about gender roles that is specific to pregnancy
and work. As discussed above, like other gender ideologies, the gender ideology
behind pregnancy discrimination is race- and class- specific and affects women
in different ways.
For women whose fertility is highly socially valued—especially married,
white, professional women—the gender ideology behind pregnancy
discrimination marginalizes women’s work contributions in relation to their
maternal roles. Such women risk being seen as less valuable workers because
they presumptively are (or should be) more attached to their maternal roles, and
hence are seen as at greater risk of stepping off of the career ladder.

324. See Caroline Gatrell, Policy and the Pregnant Body at Work: Strategies of Secrecy, Silence and
Supra-Performance, 18 GENDER, WORK AND ORG. 158, 174-77 (2011).
325. Cf. Halpert, supra note 241, at 658 (“it is unknown whether the voluntary nature of most
pregnancies results in perceptions of and behaviors toward pregnant women that differ from
attitudes about employees with involuntary disabilities”).
326. See Gattrell, supra note 245, at 97, 107 (citing research “observ[ing] how, in the context of
management and organization, women’s maternal ‘bodies. . .their ability to procreate, their
pregnancy, breastfeeding and childcare. . .are [treated as] suspect, stigmatized and used as grounds
for control and exclusion’” and citing literature contending that “organizational antipathy to
breastfeeding is due to employers’ deep-seated fears about women’s bodies, which they regard as
unreliable and unpredictable in a way which does not apply to the bodies of men or to nonmothers”).

Brake-Growssman Proof 2 (Do Not Delete)

2/18/2014 11:24 AM

UNPROTECTED SEX

117

For women whose fertility is less socially valued—especially women of
color, unmarried women, and lower- and working-class women—it is not a
chivalrous gender ideology that prioritizes motherhood over work, but one
casting them as unreliable, fungible workers undeserving of accommodations.
Women of color have never fit into the cult of motherhood that pampers
pregnant women and values them as mothers-to-be. The many African
American women slaves who worked in the fields until they gave birth, only to
return to forced labor the next day, provide a stark historic illustration of the
racial specificity of the gender ideologies that animate refusals to accommodate
pregnant women workers.
Although the gender ideologies of pregnancy discrimination are plural
rather than monolithic, there is nonetheless a distinctively gendered (both
prescriptive and descriptive) stereotyping involved in pregnancy discrimination.
Pregnancy does not just involve the body, even when taking a broad view of the
social body; it is also a condition that triggers gender role-typing, replete with
presumed and prescribed notions about women’s proper roles at work and in the
family. To make this point is not at all to deny that there is also an ideology
about disabled workers that underlies disability discrimination—one that
devalues the contributions and worth of people who are labeled disabled and
sorts them into roles defined by this construction. Certain aspects of these
ideologies—about both pregnancy and disability—surely overlap, in that a
condition of the body is used to define a person’s worth and proper roles.
Nevertheless, it is not primarily the bodily condition of pregnancy that defines
and limits women’s roles, but the gendered future that it signals for women
when that bodily condition ceases. Every pregnancy has an endpoint, whether
by miscarriage, termination, or childbirth. Even with that endpoint in sight,
pregnancy is a marker of a woman’s future. Assumptions about the pregnant
woman’s future—assumptions relating to her presumed and prescribed maternal
roles vis-à-vis work—have historically shaped the treatment of pregnant women
at work and continue to do so today.327 When that treatment forces pregnant
women out of jobs, it reinforces gendered expectations about women’s work and
reproductive lives.328
To be clear, the point here is not that pregnancy should not be seen as a
disability that is covered under the ADA. We are persuaded both by the social
model of disability and by the argument that this model encompasses pregnancy.
Rather, our point is a more nuanced one: in addition to pushing back against the
exclusion of pregnancy from the ADA, it is also important to reclaim the PDA as
a viable remedy for pregnancy-based discrimination at work. Pregnancy
discrimination is a distinctively gendered phenomenon—not just because of the

327. See McDonald, Expecting the Worst, supra note 310 at 230 (discussing psychological literature
from the 1950’s pathologizing maternal employment); see also NAT’L P’SHIP OF WOMEN & FAMILIES,
Expecting Better: A State-by-State Analysis of Laws that Help New Parents (May 2012) (discussing
workers’ rights under current state laws and the strides states have made in promoting economic
security of new parents).
328. Cf. Rosenblum, supra note 315, at 66 (“The market is also sexed: the perception that ‘mothers’
are primarily responsible for children persists in part because of the continued domination of men in
the market context.”); STEPHANIE COONTZ, MYTH OF THE OPT-OUT MOM, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER
IN THE UNITED STATES; AN INTEGRATED STUDY 473, 473-75.(7th ed. 2006).
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biological reality that only women’s bodies become pregnant, but also because of
the gender ideologies about women, work, and maternity that underlie it.
Pregnancy discrimination is an integral block in the edifice of women’s
subordination, and we would lose something important by giving up on the
promise of sex equality law to adequately account for pregnancy. And yet,
specifying what that “something important” is is the part of our argument that is
the most difficult to articulate. If litigating under the ADA works for pregnant
plaintiffs, why keep up the fight under the PDA? We believe that there is
something valuable in making a sex equality challenge to the barriers
confronting pregnant women at work, even if it is not so easy to articulate what
that something is. We sketch out below our (still developing) thoughts about
what, exactly, this might be.
Various voices in the academy have questioned the value of continuing to
work with feminism and feminist legal strategies as a vehicle for addressing the
problems in women’s lives. Janet Halley has famously urged taking a “break”
from feminism.329 More recently, Marc Spindelman has asked whether the
substantive tenets of feminist legal theory might be brought to bear on legal
problems without specifically using feminism, per se, to get there.330 Professor
Spindelman’s thesis is specific to the continuing viability of feminist legal theory,
which is not the same thing as the question of whether to reinvigorate a feministinspired sex discrimination law like the PDA, or abandon it in favor of a nongender specific law. Nevertheless, a decision to use the ADA as the vehicle for
accommodating pregnancy at work, rather than the PDA, might be a practical
application of proposals like Professor Spindelman’s for moving away from
explicitly feminist legal strategies. As Professor Spindelman points out,
disability feminists have been “doing” feminism in substance if not in name for
some time now.331 We are intrigued by this possibility, but not fully persuaded,
at least with respect to the practical question of whether we can completely “get
there” under the ADA while giving up on the PDA.
The seeds of a response are found in Professor Spindelman’s essay. Law is
indeed “both a repository and an important site in the construction of culture
and cultural values.”332 Framing the treatment of pregnant workers as an issue
of women’s equality brings with it a specific history of struggle that occupies a
central place within the broader movement for women’s equality. As the
American Civil Liberties Union put it, in a 1985 policy statement: “Pregnancy, or
the capacity to become pregnant, is the single most pervasive factor in the history
of sex discrimination.”333 If this at all overstates the importance of pregnancy
discrimination to the history of the women’s rights movement, it is not by much.
The history behind the PDA, specifically, reflects a broad-based movement for
women’s equality that has transformative implications for how work is
structured in relation to women’s lives. Deborah Dinner has shown that the

329. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006).
330. Marc Spindelman, Feminism Without Feminism, 9 LEGAL FEMINISM NOW 1 (2011) (urging
feminists to consider the benefits of doing feminism without feminism).
331. Id. at 17-18.
332. Id. at 9.
333. Halpert, supra note 241, at 660 (quoting the ACLU).
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history behind the PDA involves a much broader-based feminist agenda for sex
equality than has been commonly appreciated.334 More than a push for similar
treatment for pregnant workers, the grass-roots feminist movement behind the
PDA sought to redistribute the social costs of motherhood and unravel the male
breadwinner/family wage structure of work and family.335 Decades of litigation
under the PDA have helped deepen public understanding of the gender
stereotyping behind the treatment of pregnancy.336 The struggle for sex equality
rights for pregnant workers continues to mobilize the movement for women’s
equality. For example, Patricia Shiu and Stephanie Wildman detail how the
passage of the PDA and the struggles within the feminist movement over its
proper construction galvanized the social movement that ultimately succeeded
in getting California to enact the first state law to require paid leave in the U.S.337
Continuing to highlight the problems facing pregnant workers, and linking them
to the broader agenda for women’s equality, can help resist de-politicized
narratives of a purportedly post-feminist, post-sexist era.
Conversely, completely submerging pregnancy in the gender-neutral frame
of disability risks obscuring the sex inequality that comes from the refusal to
accommodate pregnant workers. A recent article by Jessica Clarke describes the
risks of universalizing sex equality claims in the guise of gender-neutrality.338
These risks include promoting “the myth of neutrality” by assimilating sex
inequality into gender-neutral injustices and draining support for more targeted
approaches to remedying gender inequality.339 As feminist scholars have long
taught, gender-neutral baselines often mask deep structures of gender
inequality.340 We should not lose sight of the fact that refusing to accommodate
pregnant workers further entrenches gender inequality in the workplace.
Despite the, at times, one-step forward, two-steps backward agony of
working in sex equality law, and the perpetual risk of backlash, we are not ready
to “close up shop” or “go entirely out of business”341 in the search for specifically
feminist legal theories to restructure work to accommodate pregnant workers.
There is an emotional and cultural resonance to labeling the unjust treatment of
pregnant women in the workplace as a gendered inequality, a form of sex
discrimination, even while recognizing that it may also be regarded as disability
discrimination. Labeling and defining the poor treatment of pregnant workers as
sex-based discrimination can build solidarity among women and illuminate
connections with other, related ways that women are subordinated at work, even

334. Dinner, supra note 22.
335. See id. at 463.
336. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to Carhart, 70
OHIO ST. L.J. 1095, 1112 (2009).
337. Shiu & Wildman, supra note 283, at 119.
338. Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND.
L.J. 1219 (2011).
339. Id. at 1246. See also Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 112 (2007) (discussing the limits of
universally-designed solutions to racial inequality in the workplace, such as a just-cause employment
law rule).
340. See Chamallas, supra note 66, at 8-10.
341. Spindelman, supra note 330, at 10.
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while simultaneously acknowledging it as disability discrimination can build
bridges and coalitions between social movements for gender justice and justice
for persons with disabilities.342
Sidestepping the PDA and putting all our litigation eggs in the ADA basket
is not likely to avoid a backlash to efforts to protect the rights of pregnant
workers.343 Certainly, the ADA has been targeted for more than its share of
backlash.344 Bringing the rights of pregnant workers into the broader fold of the
ADA will not defuse the clash of gender ideologies at the heart of these
disputes.345 To cite just one example, dressing the new mandate for insurance
coverage of prescription contraceptives in the gender-neutral clothes of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not mitigate the clash of gender
ideologies behind opposition to that expansion.346 Without a doubt, advocates
for pregnant workers’ rights will still need effective strategies for dealing with
backlash in the gender culture wars, regardless of whether legal claims are
asserted under the ADA, the PDA or both.
Pressing forward with rights under the PDA may help promote a broader
agenda for sex discrimination law. There are doctrinal connections between the
PDA’s current stingy approach to pregnancy discrimination and discrimination
law’s inadequate treatment of sex discrimination generally. If pregnancy is
farmed out entirely to the ADA without fighting these battles under the PDA, the
problematic rifts in Title VII doctrine that have cut short the statute’s promise
may become more solidified. For example, Michael Selmi has pointed out that
courts’ vision of what a nondiscriminatory world looks like, and of what
discrimination looks like, shapes how courts apply the intent requirement when
searching for intentional discrimination.347 The stereotype that pregnancy is a
trigger point that reduces women’s attachment to the labor force sets the stage

342. Cf. Dinner, supra note 22, at 477-48 (“[U]tilizing antidiscrimination law to redress sex equality
is important as a means to connect present-day structural disadvantage to history. Naming the
workplace structures that exclude childbearing women from the workplace as ‘discrimination’ insists
on recalling how workplace policies and norms derived from the family-wage system.”).
343. See Clarke, supra note 338, at 1243-45 (proposing a framework for evaluating universalist
approaches over equality-based claims that, in part, considers the prospects for mitigating backlash).
344. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, Backlash Against the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1
(2000).
345. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Procreation: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008) (arguing that reframing abortion as a human right or
universal right to dignity will not avoid the centrality of clashes over women’s roles and the need to
engage sex equality concerns in the conflict over abortion rights).
346. See generally Sarah Kiff, Meet Sandra Fluke: The Woman You Didn’t Hear at Congress’
Contraceptives
Hearing,
Washington
Post,
(Feb.
16,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/meet-sandra-fluke-the-woman-youdidnt-hear-at-congress-contraceptives-hearing/2012/02/16/gIQAJh57HR_blog.html
(discussing
controversy over refusal to allow Georgetown law student opportunity to testify in opposition to
denial of health insurance coverage for contraceptives); Dean Schabner and Matt Negrin, Sandra Fluke
Says Rush Limbaugh’s Apology Doesn’t Change Anything, ABC News, (March 3, 2012),
abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/rush-limbaugh-apologizes-calling-sandra-flukeslut/print?id=15841687 (discussing controversy after Rush Limbaugh called this student a “slut” and
a “prostitute”).
347. Selmi, supra note 281, at 286-91
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for judges to expect that a non-discriminatory employer would deny
accommodations for a rational business reason rather than a discriminatory one.
Beliefs about women’s “choices” to opt out of the paid labor force, and about
whether pregnant women deserve accommodations if they choose to remain at
work, provide tempting alternative explanations besides discrimination that
appeal to some judges. Dismantling the gender ideologies that create such
expectations might be aided by situating the struggle in the social and historic
movement for women’s equality. Stereotypes related to pregnancy are integral
to the culture wars over “choice,” “opt-out” and the lingering societal
ambivalence about working mothers. Although the ADA may get women
litigants to the same place in the end, there is still value in continuing to fight
pregnancy discrimination under the rubric of sex equality, even as feminist
litigators also embrace the movement to link pregnancy and disability. There is
nothing to be gained by choosing sides, and much to lose by conceding these
battles under the PDA.
Finally, retaining a sex equality right connects pregnancy to other legal and
social issues central to women’s equality. The treatment of pregnancy at work is
just one of the issues women face in seeking to integrate multiple aspects of their
reproductive and family lives in a work world designed for an implicitly male
ideal worker. There are a range of “accommodations” women may need to
combine their reproductive lives with their work lives, including access to
contraception, access to and time off for assisted reproduction technologies, and
breaks for breastfeeding/lactation.
Giving up on pregnancy as a sex
discrimination claim does not bode well for these issues, which are unlikely to
get ADA coverage. Nor does it bode well for the sex equality argument for
reproductive choice to terminate a pregnancy, an argument that has gained
traction since the Supreme Court’s Casey decision.348 The precariousness of the
privacy right for abortion necessitates continuing feminist efforts to ground the
right in sex equality, even as theorists and litigators continue to explore new
possibilities for securing a woman’s right to self-determination.349 In addition,
the broader movement for reproductive justice encompasses a wide range of
practices that interfere with women’s reproductive freedoms, including the
freedom to become a mother. Early cases challenging the treatment of pregnant
workers linked together arguments sounding in reproductive autonomy and
gender subordination.350 By litigating pregnant worker’s rights under the PDA,
the connections between women’s workplace equality and women’s
reproductive choices can be illuminated. Rather than give up on the PDA, we
should reclaim it as a crucial law in the broader movement for reproductive

348. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 928-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
349. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 66, at 389-90 (discussing feminist work to reground the abortion
right as a sex equality right); see also Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights:
Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L. J. 815 (2007).
350. See Neil Siegel & Reva Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010) (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s litigation
strategy challenging pregnancy discrimination as linking together the inter-related concerns of
gender subordination and reproductive liberty).
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justice.351 The goal of securing women’s rights in the workplace is inextricably
connected to the struggle for reproductive justice.352
In short, more is at stake in abandoning a sex discrimination claim for
pregnancy discrimination than the treatment of pregnant workers per se. Battles
over pregnancy and reproduction have played a central role in the social and
legal struggles over women’s equality. While feminist legal strategists should
pursue all available avenues to secure justice for pregnant workers, and build
bridges and broad coalitions in this pursuit, we should not abandon specifically
feminist claims for gender justice with regard to pregnancy. While the ADA
could and should play a useful role in protecting pregnant workers too, there
remains value in using a sex equality framework as a foundation to link the
broader movements to secure reproductive justice and women’s workplace
equality.
CONCLUSION
The problems with the PDA identified in this article could be fixed as they
have been created, through judicial interpretation.353 Ideally, the lower courts
would simply follow the Supreme Court’s directive in Johnson Controls to “do no
more than hold that the PDA means what it says.”354 Recent trends in the PDA
case law, however, are not encouraging.
In the thirty-five years since the PDA’s enactment, lower courts appear to
have missed the lessons of Congress’ rejection of Gilbert and Geduldig. In those
cases, the Court allowed pregnancy to be siphoned off in a class by itself when it
came to extending employment benefits to workers in need of them. Treating
pregnancy as a distinctive condition unique to women—and a voluntary one at
that, for which women themselves would be responsible—the Court placed the
work-related costs of pregnancy and childbirth on women alone. The PDA
resoundingly rejected that philosophy, recognizing that for work-related
purposes, pregnancy should be treated no worse than any other condition that
impairs employees’ work ability to a similar extent.
As employers have gradually—and at times begrudgingly—done more for
other conditions, such as on-the-job injuries and disabilities covered by the
ADA—the PDA should have extended the same treatment to pregnant workers.
Instead, courts have allowed employers to deny pregnancy the same

351. Cf. Dinner, supra note 41 (detailing the feminist legal history leading up to the PDA in which
feminist lawyers linked sex equality and reproductive liberty in fighting pregnancy discrimination in
the workplace).
352. Cf. CHAMALLAS, supra note 66, at 391 (noting Joan Williams’ observation that the ideal of
“selfless mothers” underlies the gender ideology behind denying women choice, and citing public
opinion polls showing that ¾ of Americans believe a woman should not be allowed to have an
abortion if the decision is motivated by a desire to avoid interference with her career).
353. While we would support the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), introduced by
democratic members of Congress in 2012 to guarantee pregnant women the right to reasonable
accommodations absent undue hardship on the employer, we believe that the proper interpretation
of the PDA, in relation to the ADA and other select accommodations granted to workers, would go a
long way toward securing women these protections. A full exploration of the PWFA is beyond the
scope of this article. See S. 3565, 112th Cong. (2012).
354. Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991).
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accommodations and benefits, as long as they do not detect a pregnancy-based
animus as the reason for doing so. Through reading clause one as protecting
only the status of pregnancy and not its effects, and especially by reading clause
two as barring only those failures to accommodate that can be traced to proof of
pregnancy-based animus, courts have made the PDA increasingly irrelevant to
working women.
This article has argued that there is a gender stereotyping ideology behind
pregnancy discrimination, and in particular behind refusals to accommodate
pregnancy in the workplace, that has survived and thrived in recent years in the
PDA case law. However, because it does not register with judges as pregnancybased animus, it goes unchecked by the courts. Through their insistence on proof
of animus in the PDA cases, the courts have failed to recognize that the carving
out of pregnancy for disfavored treatment is itself based on an ideology of
stereotyping about women, maternity and work: an ideology that presumes that
women’s maternity should not be accommodated in the workplace, and that
women marked by pregnancy and maternity are compromised workers.
Congress rejected such a gender ideology when it repudiated the Gilbert decision
and enacted the PDA.355 But gender norms are sticky and ideologies about
women, maternity and work not easily discarded. As is often the case when sex
discrimination law fails, it is the least privileged women—those most in need of
the law’s protections—who bear the greatest costs.

355. See S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 40 (1977) (Senate committee report on the PDA, observing that “the
assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of the sex
stereotyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace”); Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. at 211 (explaining that in passing the PDA, Congress recognized that “[c]oncern for
a woman’s existing or potential offspring historically has been the excuse for denying women equal
employment opportunities”).

